Chapter 44 gave each lakāra its ordinary time or mood: laṭ for the present, laṅ for the past not of today, lṛṭ for the future, and so on. This chapter teaches the cases where that map does not hold. A particle, a question, a word of recollection, hope, censure or astonishment can call for a different lakāra. So can a time near the present, or a wish. Almost every rule here is an apavāda, an exception to the ordinary choice. The chapter derives no new forms. Its rules choose the lakāra, and the forms come from chapter 44. After this chapter you will be able to say which lakāra a sentence takes, and why. In smarasi kṛṣṇa gokule vatsyāmaḥ "you remember, Kṛṣṇa, how we lived in Gokula", a future-looking lṛṭ tells of the past. In vasantīha purā chātrāḥ "formerly students lived here", a present laṭ does the same. kadā bhuṅkte "when will he eat?" and ayam āgacchāmi "here I come", meaning "I have just come", take laṭ for the future and the near past. devaś ced avarṣīt, dhānyam avāpsma "if the god rains, we shall sow grain" puts a hope in a past form. Censure takes laṭ or liṅ in any time, as in kathaṃ dharmaṃ tyajeḥ "how could you abandon dharma!". Later you will meet liṅ for a wish, liṅ and loṭ after verbs of desire, and the injunctive suffixes. Last come yāhi yāhīti yāti "he keeps going" and saktūn piba dhānāḥ khādety abhyavaharati "'drink the gruel, chew the grain' — so he takes his meal". The chapter has 56 sūtras, SK 2773 to SK 2828. Bhaṭṭoji also recalls, at their place in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, five sūtras he taught earlier, without new numbers. With this chapter the verbs (tiṅanta) come to an end.
suvṛṣṭiś ced abhaviṣyat tadā subhikṣam abhaviṣyat.smarasi kṛṣṇa gokule vatsyāmaḥ (lṛṭ, meaning "we lived") against abhijānāsi kṛṣṇa yad vane 'bhuñjmahi (with yad: laṅ)The chapter opens with a surprise: lṛṭ, the lakāra of the future, used for the past. Three sūtras set its limits. SK 2773 gives lṛṭ for a past not of today when a word of recollection stands near the verb. SK 2774 takes it away when the word yad "that" is used. SK 2775 gives it back as an option when two actions mark each other. Under SK 2775 Bhaṭṭoji also recalls the rule for liṭ and adds a vārttika for total denial. The running example: "You remember, Kṛṣṇa, how we lived in Gokula." The living is past, so one expects laṅ: avasāma. With smarasi "you remember" beside it, the verb is lṛṭ: vatsyāmaḥ. With yad, the ordinary laṅ returns: abhuñjmahi "we ate".
Rule. When a word that makes recollection (smṛti) known is the upapada, lṛṭ comes after a root. It comes in the sense of the past not of today. An upapada is a word standing beside the verb that the rule names as its condition. Bhaṭṭoji calls this rule an apavāda of laṅ (SK 2205).
Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree on the time words. "In the past" is the heading bhūte. "Not of today" is carried forward from anadyatane laṅ (SK 2205). One of them glosses abhijñāvacana as "that by which recollection is spoken, that is, made known".
Example.
the past, not of today: "we lived in Gokula"
→ by SK 2205 one expects laṅ: avasāma "we lived"
→ the upapada smarasi "you remember" is present
→ this rule: lṛṭ instead → vatsyāmaḥ
→ smarasi kṛṣṇa gokule vatsyāmaḥ "You remember, Kṛṣṇa, how we lived in Gokula."
Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that vatsyāmaḥ here means avasāma, "we lived". They also agree that the whole clause is the object of smarasi: "you remember our living in Gokula". One of them compares paśya mṛgo dhāvati "see, the deer runs", where a whole clause is likewise the object of "see".
Applies when / blocked by. The word need not mean "remember" outright. Bhaṭṭoji says the rule also applies with budhyase "you know", cetayase "you are aware" and the like. By force of context these too can convey recollection. One of his commentators says this is why the sūtra says vacana, "a word that makes known".
Watch out. vatsyāmaḥ looks like "we shall live". In this sentence it reports the past. The lakāra is chosen by the rule, not by the time it usually marks.
Rule. When yad "that" is used, what was just stated does not occur. The lṛṭ of SK 2773 does not come. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators takes yadi in the sūtra as the seventh case of yad: "in connection with yad". The other says that when lṛṭ is barred, the general rule, laṅ, applies.
Example.
the past, not of today: "we ate in the forest", with abhijānāsi "you recall"
→ SK 2773 would give lṛṭ
→ yad is used, so this rule bars it
→ the general rule, SK 2205: laṅ → abhuñjmahi
→ abhijānāsi kṛṣṇa yad vane 'bhuñjmahi "You recall, Kṛṣṇa, that we ate in the forest."
Rule. In the domain just stated, lṛṭ comes optionally. That domain is a word of recollection as upapada, and the past not of today. The condition is that the root's meaning is in mutual expectancy (sākāṅkṣa). Bhaṭṭoji explains this as the relation of what marks (lakṣaṇa) and what is marked (lakṣya). One of his commentators calls it the relation of what makes known and what is made known.
Example.
two past actions: "we lived in the forest" and "there we grazed the cows"
→ the living is the mark; the grazing is what is marked
→ this rule: lṛṭ, optionally, in both verbs
→ smarasi kṛṣṇa vane vatsyāmas tatra gāś cārayiṣyāmaḥ "You remember, Kṛṣṇa, we lived in the forest; there we grazed the cows."
In the other option, laṅ. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives the forms: vane avasāma, gā acārayāma.
Why is the living the mark? One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says the living is well known, so it makes the other known. The grazing does not at once come to mind, so it is what is made known. The other commentator notes that yad is understood here but not used. So SK 2774 does not touch the sentence.
Applies when / blocked by. The option holds even when yad is used. Bhaṭṭoji says it overrides SK 2774 because it is the later rule (paratvāt). One of his commentators adds that this is why the sūtra was not placed before na yadi. The other cites the Bhāṣya, Patañjali's great commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī. It says the option holds with yad and without it.
Recalled here: parokṣe liṭ (SK 2171). Bhaṭṭoji now recalls the rule for liṭ at its place in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, with the form cakāra "he did". He adds a point about the first person (uttama-puruṣa). There, being beyond one's perception comes about through distraction of mind and the like.
supto 'haṃ kila vilalāpa "Asleep, I lamented, it seems."bahu jagada purastāt tasya mattā kilāham "Intoxicated, I spoke much in front of him, it seems."Why is this needed? One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators explains. What "I" refers to is directly perceived, so how can liṭ occur in the first person? Hence the distraction: sleep in the first line, intoxication in the second. "And the like" takes in absorption in something else.
Vārttika: atyantāpahnave liḍ vaktavyaḥ. "liṭ is to be stated in total denial (atyantāpahnava)." One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says the vārttika is for what was not beyond perception.
→ question: kaliṅgeṣv avātsīḥ "You stayed among the Kaliṅgas?"
→ reply: nāhaṃ kaliṅgān jagāma "I never went to the Kaliṅgas."
The denial is total because even the going, the cause of the stay, is denied. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree on this. One of them adds that Kaliṅga was a forbidden country. The same commentator adds: one who denies only the going makes no total denial, so laṅ comes: na kaliṅgeṣv agaccham "I did not go among the Kaliṅgas".
vasantīha purā chātrāḥ (laṭ) / avātsuḥ (luṅ) / avasan (laṅ) / ūṣuḥ (liṭ), "formerly students lived here"Still in the past, seven sūtras let a particle or a question change the lakāra. With ha or śaśvat, laṅ may replace liṭ (SK 2776). In a question about recent time, laṅ and liṭ both come (SK 2777). With sma, even the present laṭ reports the past (SK 2778–2779). In a reply with nanu, na or nu, laṭ comes again (SK 2780–2781). With purā "formerly", luṅ and laṭ come beside the ordinary lakāras (SK 2782). The running example says "formerly students lived here" in four ways. laṭ gives vasantīha purā chātrāḥ. luṅ gives avātsuḥ, laṅ gives avasan, and liṭ gives ūṣuḥ.
Rule. When ha or śaśvat is the upapada, laṅ comes in the domain of liṭ. By ca "and", liṭ comes too. The domain of liṭ is the past, not of today and beyond perception (SK 2171).
Example.
the past, not of today, unseen: "he did"
→ by SK 2171 one expects liṭ: cakāra
→ with ha, this rule adds laṅ → akarot
→ iti hākarot or iti ha cakāra "so indeed he did".
In the same way: śaśvad akarot or śaśvac cakāra "he did it again and again".
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators calls the rule clear and says nothing more.
Rule. When the matter asked about is of near time, laṅ and liṭ both come. This is again in the domain of liṭ: the past, not of today and beyond perception. Bhaṭṭoji glosses praśna as "what is to be asked". One of his commentators says praśna is formed in the sense of the object, hence that meaning.
Example.
a recent past action, asked about: "did he go?"
→ this rule: laṅ or liṭ
→ agacchat kim or jagāma kim "Did he go?"
When the time is not near, only liṭ comes: kaṃsaṃ jaghāna kim "Did he kill Kaṃsa?"
Applies when / blocked by. There must be a question. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives the counter-example jagāma caitraḥ "Caitra went", where only liṭ comes. How recent counts as "near", scholars discuss this.
Rule. When sma is used, laṭ comes in the domain of liṭ. Bhaṭṭoji calls this an apavāda of liṭ. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that sma is an indeclinable that makes past time manifest.
Example.
the past, not of today, unseen: "Yudhiṣṭhira sacrificed"
→ by SK 2171 one expects liṭ
→ sma is used; this rule: laṭ → yajati
→ yajati sma yudhiṣṭhiraḥ "Yudhiṣṭhira sacrificed."
Watch out. yajati looks like a present, "he sacrifices". With sma it reports the past.
Rule. laṭ with sma comes also when the past not of today is not beyond perception (aparokṣa). Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "in the past not of today, laṭ comes when sma is used".
Example.
the past, not of today, seen by the speaker: "father said so"
→ by SK 2205 one expects laṅ
→ sma is used; this rule: laṭ → bravīti
→ evaṃ sma pitā bravīti "Thus father said."
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators glosses the sentence as "father spoke thus".
Rule. In the reply of one who has been asked, when nanu is used, laṭ comes in the past. Bhaṭṭoji notes that "not of today" (anadyatana) and "beyond perception" (parokṣa) have ceased (nivṛtta). They are no longer carried forward. So the rule speaks of the past in general.
Example.
question: akārṣīḥ kim "Did you do it?"
→ the reply tells of the past: "I did"
→ the reply uses nanu; this rule: laṭ → karomi
→ nanu karomi bhoḥ "Why, I did, sir!"
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says karomi here means akārṣam "I did".
Applies when / blocked by. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators notes that the laṭ comes in the reply only, not in the question. He also explains why the sūtra must say pṛṣṭa "of one who has been asked". Every reply follows a question, so the word seems redundant. But Kaiyaṭa, a commentator on the Bhāṣya, holds that even a statement that contradicts another is a prativacana, a "reply". So the word pṛṣṭa is needed.
Rule. When na "no" or nu "surely" is used, laṭ comes optionally in the past. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators reads nanvoḥ as "of na and nu" and supplies "in the past". Bhaṭṭoji's examples are again a question and its replies.
Example.
question: akārṣīḥ kim "Did you do it?"
→ with na: na karomi (laṭ) or nākārṣam (luṅ) "No, I did not."
→ with nu: ahaṃ nu karomi (laṭ) or ahaṃ nv akārṣam (luṅ) "I did, surely."
Applies when / blocked by. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says what comes in the other option. It is luṅ, as in the examples. But in the past not of today it is laṅ.
Rule. With the word purā "formerly", in the past not of today, luṅ comes optionally. By ca, laṭ comes too. But not when sma is used. In the other option, the lakāra comes as it would otherwise. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree what that means: liṭ if the action is beyond perception, otherwise laṅ.
The words "not of today" ceased at SK 2780. Bhaṭṭoji says they come back here by the frog's leap (maṇḍūkapluti). One of his commentators says that this rests on the explanation of the tradition alone. The same commentator explains the form of the sūtra: puri is the seventh case of the indeclinable purā, with its ā lost.
Example.
the past, not of today: "formerly students lived here"
→ with purā, by ca: laṭ → vasantīha purā chātrāḥ
→ this rule: luṅ → avātsuḥ
→ the other option, not beyond perception: laṅ (SK 2205) → avasan
→ the other option, beyond perception: liṭ (SK 2171) → ūṣuḥ.
Applies when / blocked by. Why "not with sma"? Bhaṭṭoji gives yajati sma purā "he sacrificed formerly". He gives only the form. Its laṭ is the one SK 2778 gives with sma, and luṅ does not come.
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators notes that this sūtra closes the second quarter of the third book of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Bhaṭṭoji ends with a heading for what follows: it is taught "while bhaviṣyati 'in the future' is carried forward". The same commentator names the source, bhaviṣyati gamyādayaḥ (SK 3171).
kadā bhuṅkte / karhi bhuṅkte (laṭ) / bhokṣyate (lṛṭ) / bhoktā (luṭ), "when will he eat?"Now the time is the future. The heading bhaviṣyati "in the future" (SK 3171) holds for six sūtras. Each lets laṭ, the present, stand for the future under some condition. The particles yāvat and purā call for it (SK 2783). With kadā and karhi "when?" it is optional (SK 2784). It is optional too with a form of kim "who? which?" and a wish to obtain (SK 2785). The other conditions are an end gained through what is sought (SK 2786) and a sense that marks the meaning of loṭ (SK 2787). After a muhūrta (a period of the day), liṅ comes as well (SK 2788). The running example asks "when will he eat?". It takes laṭ as kadā bhuṅkte or karhi bhuṅkte. It takes lṛṭ as bhokṣyate and luṭ as bhoktā.
Rule. When the nipātas yāvat and purā are used, laṭ comes in the future. Bhaṭṭoji says these two particles convey certainty. One of his commentators calls the rule an apavāda of luṭ and the rest.
Example.
the future: "he will surely eat"
→ one expects lṛṭ (SK 2193) or luṭ (SK 2185)
→ the nipāta yāvat or purā is used; this rule: laṭ → bhuṅkte
→ yāvad bhuṅkte, purā bhuṅkte "he will surely eat".
Applies when / blocked by. The words must be nipātas. Bhaṭṭoji gives two counter-examples.
yāvad dāsyate tāvad bhokṣyate "he will eat as much as he will be given". One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators explains. This yāvat is formed with the affix vatup, in the sense of measure, so it is not a nipāta. laṭ does not come.karaṇībhūtayā purā yāsyati "he will go by means of the city". Here purā is the third case of pur "city", not the particle. Bhaṭṭoji adds "serving as instrument" to bring this out, one of his commentators says.The other commentator adds a counter-example for the future not of today, with luṭ: yāvad dātā tāvad bhoktā.
Rule. When kadā or karhi "when?" is used, laṭ comes optionally in the future. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says what comes otherwise: luṭ and lṛṭ, as they would apply.
Example.
the future: "when will he eat?"
→ with kadā or karhi, this rule: laṭ → kadā bhuṅkte, karhi bhuṅkte
→ the other option: lṛṭ → bhokṣyate
→ or luṭ → bhoktā.
Applies when / blocked by. karhi is itself taught for time not of today. So may karhi take the general future lṛṭ, karhi bhokṣyate? Scholars discuss this.
How can this laṭ, given for the future in general, alternate with luṭ, whose field is narrower? One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators answers. Some sūtras, this one among them, are read into anadyatane luṭ (SK 2185) as the desired forms require. So laṭ also comes in the field of luṭ.
Rule. When a form of kim (kiṃvṛtta) is used, and the speaker shows a wish to obtain (lipsā), laṭ comes optionally in the future. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators glosses kiṃvṛtta as "what is formed by the word kim". Bhaṭṭoji's gloss is "in the future, laṭ optionally".
Example.
a hungry man asks: "whom will you feed?"
→ a form of kim: kam, kataram, katamam "whom, which of the two, which of the many"
→ the wish to obtain food is shown; this rule: laṭ → bhojayasi
→ the other option: lṛṭ bhojayiṣyasi, or luṭ bhojayitāsi
→ kaṃ kataraṃ katamaṃ vā bhojayasi "Whom, which of the two, or which of the many will you feed?"
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says to supply "[me,] hungry and wanting food".
Applies when / blocked by. There must be a wish to obtain. Without it, laṭ does not come: kaḥ pāṭaliputraṃ gamiṣyati "Who will go to Pāṭaliputra?"
Watch out. Which words count as "a form of kim"? Scholars discuss this. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators reports the view of the Vṛtti, an older running commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī. On that view only the case-forms of kim count, with its forms in -tara and -tama (kataraḥ, katamaḥ). Then with kadā the laṭ comes by SK 2784, not by this rule. That commentator himself rejects the restriction. He follows the Bhāṣya on the sūtra yadvṛttān nityam, and takes every form of kim, kadā included. The other commentator reports some who leave out kadā, kutra and the like, for want of usage.
Rule. laṭ comes optionally in the future when an end is understood to be gained through what is sought (lipsyamāna). Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: when heaven and the like is gained through food and the like that is sought.
Example.
the future: "he who will give food will go to heaven"
→ heaven is gained through the food given; this rule: laṭ → yo 'nnaṃ dadāti sa svargaṃ yāti
→ the other option, lṛṭ → yo 'nnaṃ dāsyati sa svargaṃ yāsyati
→ or luṭ → yo 'nnaṃ dātā sa svargaṃ yātā.
Bhaṭṭoji gives the three in one sentence. One of his commentators says they are construed pair by pair, as above.
Applies when / blocked by. Wherever an end is gained through something sought, a wish to obtain is present. So would SK 2785 not already give laṭ? Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that this rule is for sentences without a form of kim. Bhaṭṭoji's example has none.
Rule. Take a root standing in a sense that marks the meaning of loṭ. After it, laṭ comes optionally in the future. The meaning of loṭ is urging (praiṣa) and the like. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives the reason. loṭ is taught by loṭ ca (SK 2194), which carries forward the senses of SK 2208.
Example.
two actions: Kṛṣṇa's eating, and the urging "graze the cows"
→ the eating marks the time of the urging
→ after bhuj "eat", this rule: laṭ → bhuṅkte
→ kṛṣṇaś ced bhuṅkte tvaṃ gāś cāraya "When Kṛṣṇa eats, you graze the cows."
In the other option Bhaṭṭoji names luṭ and lṛṭ. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators give the sentences: kṛṣṇaś ced bhoktā, kṛṣṇaś ced bhokṣyate, tvaṃ gāś cāraya.
Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree on the sense: "at meal time, you must graze the cows". One of them calls Kṛṣṇa's eating the delimiter of the urging, which is the meaning of loṭ in cāraya.
Rule. When the time is later than a muhūrta, liṅ comes, and by ca laṭ. Both are optional, in the future, after a root in the sense that marks the meaning of loṭ. Bhaṭṭoji explains the word ūrdhvamauhūrtika: "what occurs after a muhūrta". By nipātana (the form is fixed by the sūtra's own wording) it is a compound, with vṛddhi in its second member. One of his commentators construes "later than a muhūrta" with "marking the meaning of loṭ".
Example.
the future, after a muhūrta: "if the teacher comes"
→ this rule: liṅ → āgacchet, or laṭ → āgacchati
→ the other option: lṛṭ → āgamiṣyati, or luṭ → āgantā
→ muhūrtād upari upādhyāyaś ced āgacchet … atha tvaṃ chando 'dhīṣva "If the teacher comes after a muhūrta, then you study the Veda."
Applies when / blocked by. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that the word takes the taddhita affix ṭhañ by kālāṭ ṭhañ (SK 1381). They raise a doubt: the usual compound rule does not allow this compound. Hence Bhaṭṭoji's "by nipātana". One of them adds that one would expect vṛddhi on the first member. So "vṛddhi of the second member" is also by nipātana.
Watch out. SK 2818 has the same words, liṅ cordhvamauhūrtike, but is a different sūtra in a different place. Do not confuse the two.
devaś ced avarṣīt / varṣati / varṣiṣyati, dhānyam avāpsma / vapāmaḥ / vapsyāmaḥ ("if the god rains, we shall sow"; luṅ as for the past, laṭ as for the present, lṛṭ)These four sūtras treat one time as if it were another. This is atideśa, an extension. A past or future near the present may be spoken of as present (SK 2789). A hope about the future may be spoken of as past or as present (SK 2790). With a word for "quickly" the hope takes lṛṭ (SK 2791). With a word that itself means "I hope", it takes liṅ (SK 2792). The running example is a farmer's hope: "if the god rains, we shall sow grain". As for the past it takes luṅ: avarṣīt … avāpsma. As for the present it takes laṭ: varṣati … vapāmaḥ. Otherwise it takes lṛṭ: varṣiṣyati … vapsyāmaḥ.
Rule. In a time near the present, suffixes come optionally as they do for the present. Bhaṭṭoji makes the scope wide. Take every suffix taught from vartamāne laṭ (SK 2151) up to uṇādayo bahulam (SK 3169). Each comes, under the same condition, in a past or future near the present. One of his commentators adds that only the past and the future can be near the present.
Bhaṭṭoji explains the word: sāmīpya means just samīpa "near", with the affix ṣyañ in its own sense.
Example.
question: kadā āgato 'si "When did you come?"
→ the coming is just past
→ this rule: laṭ, as for the present → ayam āgacchāmi "Here I come", that is, "I have just come"
→ the other option: luṅ → ayam āgamam.
question: kadā gamiṣyasi "When will you go?"
→ the going is just ahead
→ this rule: laṭ → eṣa gacchāmi "Here I go", that is, "I am about to go"
→ the other option: lṛṭ → gamiṣyāmi.
Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that ayam "here" and eṣa "this one" make the nearness manifest. One of them says ayam points to the speaker's look of one just arrived: sweat, girded loins and the like.
Applies when / blocked by. "The same condition" matters. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives an instance: śānan, taught after pūṅ and yaj, comes only after those roots. The time must be near. The same commentator's counter-example: kadā āgato bhavān "when did you come?" — asmān māsāt pūrvasmin māse āgaccham "I came in the month before this one". He adds that the Bhāṣya rejects this sūtra. The present can be laid upon what is near it, as one calls the bank near the Gaṅgā "the Gaṅgā".
Rule. When hope (āśaṃsā) is expressed, suffixes come optionally as for the past, and as for the present, in future time. Bhaṭṭoji says "near the present" is not carried forward here. One of his commentators defines āśaṃsā as the wish to obtain something desired, not yet obtained. There is no such wish for the past, so the time is the future. The other commentator says the same: the hope is present, but its object, the rain, lies in the future.
Example.
a hope about the future: "if the god rains, we shall sow grain"
→ as for the past: luṅ → devaś ced avarṣīt, dhānyam avāpsma
→ as for the present: laṭ → devaś ced varṣati, dhānyaṃ vapāmaḥ
→ the other option: lṛṭ → devaś ced varṣiṣyati, dhānyaṃ vapsyāmaḥ.
Bhaṭṭoji gives all three in one sentence. One of his commentators construes them pair by pair, as above. Both the rain and the sowing are objects of the hope, he says, so both take luṅ. He takes deva "the god" as Parjanya, the rain-god.
Applies when / blocked by. Bhaṭṭoji cites a maxim: sāmānyātideśe viśeṣānatideśaḥ. When the general is extended, the particular is not. Only the general past, luṅ, is extended. So laṅ and liṭ, taught for particular pasts, do not come. Without hope, the future is ordinary: one of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives gamiṣyati "he will go".
Watch out. avarṣīt and avāpsma look past: "it rained", "we sowed". In this sentence they speak of a hoped-for future.
Rule. When a word meaning "quickly" (kṣipra) is the upapada, lṛṭ comes. This holds in the domain of the preceding rule, when hope is expressed. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that vacana "a word for" brings in the synonyms of kṣipra. They call this rule an apavāda of SK 2790.
Example.
a hope about the future, with a word for "quickly"
→ SK 2790 would allow past-like or present-like forms
→ this rule: lṛṭ only → yāsyati, vapsyāmaḥ
→ vṛṣṭiś cet kṣipram āśu tvaritaṃ vā yāsyati, śīghraṃ vapsyāmaḥ "If the rain comes quickly, swiftly, speedily, we shall sow promptly."
Applies when / blocked by. Why does the sūtra name lṛṭ, when "not" (na) could have been said? Bhaṭṭoji answers: so that lṛṭ comes in the field of luṭ as well. One of his commentators explains. "Not" would only cancel the past-like and present-like forms. Then for a time after today, luṭ would still come. Naming lṛṭ makes it the only lakāra, even there. Bhaṭṭoji's example: śvaḥ śīghraṃ vapsyāmaḥ "Tomorrow we shall sow promptly." "Tomorrow" is not of today, yet luṭ does not come.
Rule. When a word expressing hope is the upapada, liṅ comes in the future. Bhaṭṭoji adds: "and not as for the past". One of his commentators reads this as "nor as for the present" too. Both commentators call the rule an apavāda of SK 2790. The one who adds "nor as for the present" names both the past-like and the present-like forms.
Example.
a hope, with the word āśaṃse "I hope"
→ SK 2790 would allow past-like forms
→ this rule: liṅ → adhīyīya
→ gurus ced upeyād āśaṃse 'dhīyīya "If the teacher comes, I hope I may study."
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators adds prārthaye 'dhīyīya and icchāmo vayam adhīyīmahi.
Applies when / blocked by. With a word for "quickly" as well, which rule wins? Bhaṭṭoji gives āśaṃse kṣipram adhīyīya "I hope I may study quickly". Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that liṅ comes, not the lṛṭ of SK 2791, because this rule is later.
Watch out. SK 2790 needs only that hope is expressed. This rule needs a word that means "hope", such as āśaṃse, standing beside the verb.
yāvajjīvam annam adāt (luṅ, not laṅ) / dāsyati (lṛṭ, not luṭ)Two lakāras are kept for time not of today: laṅ for the past (SK 2205) and luṭ for the future (SK 2185). These four sūtras bar them, though the time is not today. The rules use the phrase anadyatanavat, "as for time not of today". When it is denied, laṅ and luṭ give way, and the general luṅ and lṛṭ come instead. The bar holds for an action that runs on, or one close in time (SK 2793). It holds for the nearer part of a stretch with a stated limit (SK 2794–2795). For the farther part it is optional (SK 2796). The running example: "as long as he lived he gave food". The giving runs on through a life, long before today, yet the verb is luṅ, adāt, not laṅ. Of the future, "he will give" is dāsyati (lṛṭ), not luṭ.
Rule. When continuity of the action (kriyāprabandha) or proximity (sāmīpya) is understood, the suffixes are not as for time not of today. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: when continuity (sātatya) or proximity of the action is understood, laṅ and luṭ do not come. One of his commentators draws the result: in the past luṅ, in the future lṛṭ.
Example.
continuity, in the past: "as long as he lived he gave food"
→ the giving was not of today; SK 2205 would give laṅ
→ the giving ran on; this rule bars laṅ
→ the general past, luṅ (SK 2218) → yāvajjīvam annam adāt.
continuity, in the future: "as long as he lives he will give food"
→ SK 2185 would give luṭ; this rule bars it
→ the general future, lṛṭ (SK 2193) → yāvajjīvam annaṃ dāsyati.
Bhaṭṭoji defines proximity: no separation by anything of the same kind. One of his commentators gives the point. Some days of the dark fortnight may lie between, but no other full moon. So the last full moon is still "proximate".
→ past: yeyaṃ paurṇamāsy atikrāntā tasyām agnīn ādhita, somenāyaṣṭa "On this full-moon day that has passed he set up the fires; he sacrificed with soma." (luṅ)
→ future: yeyam amāvāsyā''gāminī tasyām agnīn ādhāsyate, somena yakṣyate "On this new-moon day that is coming he will set up the fires; he will sacrifice with soma." (lṛṭ)
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says "the fires" are the āhavanīya and the others.
Rule. In the future, when a limit (maryādā) is stated, the suffixes are not as for time not of today for the nearer part. So luṭ does not come; lṛṭ comes. "Not as for time not of today" is carried forward from SK 2793. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree that here it means "luṭ does not come".
Example.
a road to be travelled up to Pāṭaliputra, in the future
→ the nearer part: on this side of Kauśāmbī
→ this rule bars luṭ; lṛṭ → pāsyāmaḥ
→ yo 'yam adhvā gantavya ā pāṭaliputrāt tasya yad avaraṃ kauśāmbyās tatra saktūn pāsyāmaḥ "Of this road that is to be travelled up to Pāṭaliputra, in the part on this side of Kauśāmbī we shall drink barley-meal."
Applies when / blocked by. This rule is for cases with no continuity and no proximity; SK 2793 covers those. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators cites the Bhāṣya for "no continuity" and Kaiyaṭa for "no proximity". The other says the limit in this sūtra is one of place; in the next it is one of time. He gives counter-examples, among them these two.
… tatra saktūn apibāma "there we drank barley-meal".… yat paraṃ kauśāmbyās tatra saktūn pātāsmaḥ "in the part beyond Kauśāmbī we shall drink barley-meal". Here luṭ comes.Rule. The whole of SK 2794 is carried forward. It holds for a division of time (kālavibhāga) too, provided the division is not one of days and nights. Bhaṭṭoji says the rule is there to make a prohibition where the division is connected with days and nights. There luṭ comes as usual. One of his commentators gives the reason: a limit in time was already covered by SK 2794. (The other, as we saw, takes SK 2794's limit as one of place.)
Example.
a coming year, with the Āgrahāyaṇī full moon as limit
→ the nearer part, a division not of days and nights
→ this rule bars luṭ; lṛṭ → adhyeṣyāmahe
→ yo 'yaṃ vatsara āgāmī tasya yad avaram āgrahāyaṇyās tatra yuktā adhyeṣyāmahe "Of this coming year, in the part on this side of the Āgrahāyaṇī, we shall study, bound by the observances."
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators glosses āgrahāyaṇī as the full moon of the month Mārgaśīrṣa, and yuktāḥ as "bound by the observances".
Applies when / blocked by. Why "not of days and nights"? Bhaṭṭoji's counter-example: yo 'yaṃ māsa āgāmī tasya yo 'varaḥ pañcadaśarātras tatrādhyetāsmahe "Of this coming month, in the nearer fifteen nights, we shall study." The division is counted in nights, so luṭ comes: adhyetāsmahe.
Bhaṭṭoji says the rule is split off from SK 2794 for the sake of the next rule. This is yogavibhāga, splitting one rule into two. One of his commentators gives the purpose. Only the limit in time is to continue into SK 2796.
Rule. For the farther part, the suffixes are optionally not as for time not of today. So luṭ is optionally barred. Bhaṭṭoji says the two preceding sūtras are carried forward, except the word "nearer" (avarasmin). He calls this an aprāptavibhāṣā, an option for something not otherwise obtained. For the farther part no bar was obtained, so luṭ would come. This rule makes the bar optional. One of his commentators adds that "not of days and nights" still holds.
Example.
a coming year, the part beyond the Āgrahāyaṇī
→ this rule: the bar optional
→ lṛṭ adhyeṣyāmahe or luṭ adhyetāsmahe
→ yo 'yaṃ saṃvatsara āgāmī tasya yat param āgrahāyaṇyās tatrādhyeṣyāmahe, adhyetāsmahe "Of this coming year, in the part beyond the Āgrahāyaṇī, we shall study."
For a division of nights the bar does not apply even here. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives … tasya yat paraṃ pañcadaśarātrāt tatra payaḥ pātāsmaḥ "in the part beyond the fifteen nights we shall drink milk". luṭ comes.
Recalled here: liṅnimitte lṛṅ kriyātipattau (SK 2229). Bhaṭṭoji now recalls the rule for lṛṅ at its place in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Where there is a cause for liṅ and the action is not accomplished (kriyātipatti), lṛṅ comes. He remarks only that "in the future" still applies to it. His example: suvṛṣṭiś ced abhaviṣyat tadā subhikṣam abhaviṣyat "If there had been good rain, there would then have been plenty of food." One of his commentators glosses atipatti as non-accomplishment. The other notes that the rule was explained under the root bhū, in chapter 44.
kathaṃ dharmaṃ tyajeḥ / tyajasi ("how could you abandon dharma!"; liṅ / laṭ in any time), with kriyātipatti kathaṃ nāma tatrabhavān dharmam atyakṣyat (lṛṅ)Two headings come first. SK 2797 carries the lṛṅ rule into the past. SK 2798 makes it optional in the past, until SK 2809. Both work only where liṅ is taught, since only then is there a cause for liṅ. From SK 2799 on, the heading "in the future" has ceased. The rules now hold in all three times (kālatraya): past, present and future. Three sūtras treat censure (garhā). With api or jātu, laṭ comes (SK 2799). With katham "how?", liṅ or laṭ comes (SK 2800). With a form of kim, liṅ or lṛṭ comes (SK 2801). The running example: "how could you abandon dharma!" It takes liṅ, tyajeḥ, or laṭ, tyajasi, whatever the time. Where the action did not come about, lṛṅ comes: atyakṣyat.
Rule. In the past too, where there is a cause for liṅ and the action is not accomplished, lṛṅ comes. Bhaṭṭoji says the whole of the preceding sūtra is carried forward. That is liṅnimitte lṛṅ kriyātipattau (SK 2229), recalled under SK 2796. One of his commentators says this rule is a heading (adhikāra).
Applies when / blocked by. The past here is the past in general, today or not, says the other commentator. He places its examples in the seven sūtras that begin with SK 2809. Before those, SK 2798 makes the lṛṅ optional.
Rule. Bhaṭṭoji divides the words as vā ā utāpyoḥ: "optionally, up to utāpyoḥ". Up to SK 2809 (utāpyoḥ samarthayor liṅ), this is the heading: in the past, where there is a cause for liṅ, lṛṅ comes optionally. The preceding heading, SK 2797, works from SK 2809 on. "This is the distinction," Bhaṭṭoji says.
One of his commentators says the "up to" excludes SK 2809 itself. He raises a doubt: would SK 2797 then have no field? No; it works from SK 2809 up to, not including, SK 2816.
Applies when / blocked by. Both headings work only where liṅ is taught. In rules that teach laṭ and the like there is no cause for liṅ, so no lṛṅ. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says so. The other adds that the option is for the past only. In the future lṛṅ is always obligatory.
Watch out. Bhaṭṭoji's short note lṛṅ prāgvat, "lṛṅ as before", recurs below. It means: obligatory in the future, optional in the past. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators read it this way each time.
Rule. When censure (garhā) is expressed, laṭ comes in connection with api or jātu. Bhaṭṭoji says it comes in all three times. Being the later rule, it blocks luṅ and the others. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree, and add a second reason. Otherwise the rule would have no field (anavakāśatva).
Example.
censure, of any time: "you abandon your wife!", "you take up a courtesan!"
→ with api or jātu, this rule: laṭ → tyajasi, ādhatse
→ api jāyāṃ tyajasi, jātu gaṇikām ādhatse — "this is reprehensible."
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators notes that laṭ stands here even where tyakṣyasi or atyākṣīḥ would fit the time. api and jātu signal the censure, says the other.
Applies when / blocked by. No lṛṅ here. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree. The rule teaches laṭ, so there is no cause for liṅ, and SK 2798 does not reach it. They also explain "three times". "In the future" has ceased, and no time is named, so laṭ is taught for time in general.
Rule. When katham "how?" is used, liṅ comes optionally, and by ca laṭ. Bhaṭṭoji says "in censure" still applies, and the rule holds in the three times. In the other option come the lakāras proper to each of the three times.
Example.
censure, with katham: "how could you abandon dharma!"
→ this rule: liṅ → tyajeḥ, or laṭ → tyajasi
→ kathaṃ dharmaṃ tyajeḥ, kathaṃ dharmaṃ tyajasi.
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators glosses tyajeḥ as "you abandoned, will abandon, or abandon". The other lists the lakāras of the other option:
kathaṃ dharmaṃ tatyaktha;atyajaḥ;atyākṣīḥ;tyaktāsi;tyakṣyasi.Applies when / blocked by. In non-accomplishment (kriyātipatti), lṛṅ is obligatory in the future and optional in the past. So says Bhaṭṭoji. One of his commentators gives the reason. katham with censure is a cause for liṅ, so SK 2229 applies in the future and SK 2798 in the past. Bhaṭṭoji's sentence: kathaṃ nāma tatrabhavān dharmam atyakṣyat, atyākṣīd vā "How indeed would his honour abandon dharma!" atyakṣyat is lṛṅ; atyākṣīt is luṅ, a past. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators takes the sentence as his example of the obligatory lṛṅ of the future. Which half of the rule the pair shows, scholars discuss this. The same commentator calls tatrabhavān "his honour" an honorific.
Rule. When a form of kim is used, in censure, liṅ and lṛṭ come. Bhaṭṭoji says "in censure" still applies, but "optionally" (vibhāṣā) is not carried forward. One of his commentators draws the result. The ordinary lakāras of the three times do not come here as an alternative. The other reports that the Vṛtti calls liṅ and lṛṭ here apavādas of all the lakāras.
Example.
censure, with a form of kim: "who would revile Hari!"
→ this rule: liṅ → nindet, or lṛṭ → nindiṣyati
→ kaḥ kataraḥ katamo vā hariṃ nindet, nindiṣyati vā "Who — which of the two, or which of the many — would revile Hari!"
Applies when / blocked by. lṛṅ prāgvat: in non-accomplishment, lṛṅ is obligatory in the future and optional in the past. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree. A form of kim with censure is a cause for liṅ.
na saṃbhāvayāmi na marṣaye vā bhavān hariṃ nindet / nindiṣyati (liṅ / lṛṭ: "that your honour should revile Hari — I do not think it possible / I do not tolerate it")"In censure" now ceases. The next senses are incredibility (anavakḷpti), the judgement that a thing is impossible, and intolerance (amarṣa). For these, liṅ and lṛṭ come, even with no form of kim (SK 2802). With kiṃkila or a verb meaning "is", only lṛṭ comes (SK 2803). With jātu, yad, yadā or yadi, only liṅ (SK 2804). With yac ca or yatra, liṅ (SK 2805). With the same two words, censure (SK 2806) and astonishment (SK 2807) also take liṅ. In astonishment with any other word, lṛṭ comes, but not with yadi (SK 2808). These rules too hold in all three times. The running example: "that your honour should revile Hari — I do not think it possible", or "I do not tolerate it". The verb takes liṅ, nindet, or lṛṭ, nindiṣyati.
Rule. When incredibility or intolerance is expressed, liṅ and lṛṭ come, even where there is no form of kim. Bhaṭṭoji says "in censure" has ceased. He defines the senses: anavakḷpti is asaṃbhāvanā, judging a thing impossible; amarṣa is akṣamā, not bearing it. One of his commentators says liṅ and lṛṭ are carried from SK 2801 and hold in the three times.
Example.
incredibility or intolerance: "that your honour should revile Hari"
→ this rule: liṅ → nindet, or lṛṭ → nindiṣyati
→ na saṃbhāvayāmi na marṣaye vā bhavān hariṃ nindet, nindiṣyati vā "That your honour should revile Hari — I do not think it possible, or I do not tolerate it."
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators construes it so: "that your honour should revile Hari — that I do not think possible, or do not tolerate".
Applies when / blocked by. The two senses are not paired with the two lakāras one by one (yathāsaṃkhya). Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree on the sign. In a compound the word with fewer vowels normally stands first. Here amarṣa, the shorter, is placed second. One of them cites the Vṛtti for this.
lṛṅ prāgvat: obligatory in the future, optional in the past. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators supplies an example: nāhaṃ bhāvayāmi caitro harim anindiṣyat.
Rule. When kiṃkila or a word meaning "is" is the upapada, lṛṭ comes, in incredibility or intolerance. Bhaṭṭoji says those two senses are carried forward up to SK 2806, not into it. kiṃkila, the pair taken together, expresses anger. The words meaning "is" are asti, bhavati and vidyate. Bhaṭṭoji calls the rule an apavāda of liṅ. SK 2802 would give liṅ and lṛṭ; this rule leaves lṛṭ alone, Bhaṭṭoji's commentators explain.
Example.
intolerance, with kiṃkila: "you will eat a śūdra's food!"
→ SK 2802 would allow liṅ; this rule: lṛṭ only → bhokṣyase
→ na śraddadhe na marṣaye vā kiṃkila tvaṃ śūdrānnaṃ bhokṣyase "kiṃkila — you will eat a śūdra's food! I do not believe it, or I do not tolerate it."
with a word meaning "is": asti bhavati vidyate vā śūdrīṃ gamiṣyasi "Is it so — that you will go to a śūdra's wife!"
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators glosses śūdrī as "a śūdra's wife".
Applies when / blocked by. Here lṛṅ does not come, Bhaṭṭoji says. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree on the reason. liṅ is excluded, so there is no cause for liṅ.
Rule. When jātu or yad is used, liṅ comes, in incredibility or intolerance. Bhaṭṭoji calls it an apavāda of lṛṭ. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree: SK 2802 would give liṅ and lṛṭ, and this rule keeps liṅ alone. One of them says yad here is an indeclinable that looks like a case-form (vibhaktipratirūpaka).
Vārttika: yadāyadyor upasaṃkhyānam. yadā "when" and yadi "if" are to be included (upasaṃkhyāna). With them too, liṅ comes in the same senses.
Example.
incredibility or intolerance, with jātu, yad, yadā or yadi
→ SK 2802 would allow lṛṭ; this rule: liṅ only → nindet
→ jātu yad yadā yadi vā tvādṛśo hariṃ nindet, nāvakalpayāmi na marṣayāmi "That one such as you should revile Hari: I do not think it possible, I do not tolerate it."
Applies when / blocked by. lṛṅ prāgvat. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives jātu bhavān harim anindiṣyat. He adds that this rule is for sentences without censure. In censure, jātu takes laṭ by SK 2799.
Rule. When yac ca or yatra is used, liṅ comes, in incredibility or intolerance. Bhaṭṭoji gives only the example.
Example.
incredibility or intolerance, with yac ca or yatra
→ this rule: liṅ → kuryāḥ
→ yac ca yatra vā tvam evaṃ kuryāḥ, na śraddadhe na marṣayāmi "That you should act in this way: I do not believe it, I do not tolerate it."
Applies when / blocked by. Why split this rule from SK 2804? Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree: so that only these two words continue into what follows, not jātu and yad. With lṛṅ, one of them gives yac ca yatra vā tvam evam akariṣyaḥ, na śraddadhe na marṣayāmi.
Rule. In censure, when yac ca or yatra is used, liṅ alone comes. Bhaṭṭoji says "in incredibility or intolerance" has ceased. One of his commentators says liṅ here holds in the three times and is an apavāda of all the lakāras. In censure SK 2800 and SK 2801 would give their lakāras. This liṅ displaces both.
Example.
censure, with yac ca or yatra
→ this rule: liṅ alone → yājayeḥ
→ yac ca yatra vā tvaṃ śūdraṃ yājayeḥ "That you should officiate at a sacrifice for a śūdra!" — "that is improper".
Applies when / blocked by. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators add: lṛṅ as before. One of them gives yac ca yatra vā tvaṃ śūdram ayājayiṣyas tad anyāyyam.
Rule. In astonishment (citrīkaraṇa), when yac ca or yatra is used, liṅ comes. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says liṅ alone, not another lakāra. The other says the rule holds in the three times.
Example.
astonishment, with yac ca or yatra
→ this rule: liṅ → yājayeḥ
→ yac ca yatra vā tvaṃ śūdraṃ yājayeḥ "That you should officiate at a sacrifice for a śūdra!" — "this is astonishing".
With lṛṅ, one of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators gives … tvaṃ śūdram ayājayiṣyaḥ, āścaryam etat.
Watch out. The sentence is word for word the same as in SK 2806. Only the closing judgement differs: "that is improper" there, "this is astonishing" here.
Rule. In the remaining case, lṛṭ comes: astonishment, with an upapada other than yac ca and yatra. But not when the word is yadi. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators calls this an apavāda of all the lakāras.
Example.
astonishment, with nāma
→ this rule: lṛṭ → drakṣyati
→ āścaryam andho nāma kṛṣṇaṃ drakṣyati "It is astonishing: the blind man will see Kṛṣṇa!"
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators says nāma is an indeclinable that signals astonishment.
Applies when / blocked by. Why "not with yadi"? Bhaṭṭoji's counter-example: āścaryaṃ yadi so 'dhīyīta "It is astonishing if he should study." One of his commentators explains: liṅ comes by the vārttika under SK 2804, which includes yadi.
kāmo me bhuñjīta bhavān → sambhāvayāmi bhuñjīta / bhokṣyate vā bhavān → icchāmi bhuñjīta / bhuṅktāṃ vā bhavān → bhuñjīyeti icchatiThis group gives liṅ in five new senses. The first is "certainly", with uta or api. Then come a wish made known, and crediting someone with an ability. Then a cause and its result. Last come verbs of desire. The running example is one action, eating, said in four ways. "My wish is that your honour should eat" is kāmo me bhuñjīta bhavān. "I credit you with being able to eat" is sambhāvayāmi bhuñjīta bhavān, or with lṛṭ, bhokṣyate. "I wish that you would eat" is icchāmi bhuñjīta bhavān, or with loṭ, bhuṅktām. "He wishes, 'may I eat'" is bhuñjīyeti icchati.
Bhaṭṭoji has two commentators, the Bālamanoramā and the Tattvabodhinī; from here on this chapter names them.
Two things about time matter here. First, "in the future" ceased at SK 2799. So the Tattvabodhinī says that the liṅ of SK 2809 and SK 2810 holds in all three times: past, present and future. Later rules name their own time (SK 2813: future only; SK 2816: present). Second, SK 2809 changes the rule for lṛṅ, the lakāra of an action that did not come about.
Rule. When uta or api is used, and the two share one meaning, liṅ comes after the root. The shared meaning is "certainly" (bāḍham). The Tattvabodhinī adds that the rule holds in all three times.
Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "the two have the same meaning in the sense of 'certainly'". The word samarthayoḥ means "the two having the same meaning". The Bālamanoramā adds that with these particles liṅ comes, and no other lakāra.
Example.
uta "certainly" + han "to destroy", any time
→ liṅ (this rule) → uta hanyād aghaṃ hariḥ
"Hari will certainly destroy sin."
With api in the same sense: api hanyād aghaṃ hariḥ.
Applies when / blocked by. The two particles must mean "certainly". Bhaṭṭoji gives two sentences where they do not:
uta daṇḍaḥ patiṣyati "Will the stick fall?" Here uta asks a question. The ordinary future patiṣyati stays.apidhāsyati dvāram "He will close the door." Here api goes with the root dhā and makes it mean "to cover". Again the ordinary future stays.Watch out. This sūtra also marks a limit. SK 2797 made lṛṅ a heading for the past. SK 2798 made it optional in the past, up to this rule. Bhaṭṭoji says: "from here on, when there is a cause for liṅ, lṛṅ is obligatory in non-accomplishment even in the past." Non-accomplishment (kriyātipatti) means the action did not come about.
The Tattvabodhinī gives an example: utāhaniṣyad dasyuṃ rājā "the king would certainly have killed the robber". It is understood that he did not kill him, and will not. So from here on, a cause for liṅ in a failed action always gives lṛṅ, past or future.
Rule. When the speaker makes his own wish known (kāmapravedana), liṅ comes. It does not come when kaccit "I hope" is used. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "when the disclosure of one's own intention is understood, liṅ occurs, but not when kaccit [is used]."
Both of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators call it an exception (apavāda) to all the lakāras. The Tattvabodhinī adds that it holds in the three times. The Bālamanoramā reads the last word as a-kacciti, "not when kaccit".
Example.
the speaker's wish: that you eat
→ liṅ of bhuj (this rule) → kāmo me bhuñjīta bhavān
"My wish is that your honour should eat."
The Bālamanoramā construes it: "'let your honour eat' — this is my wish".
Applies when / blocked by. With kaccit there is no liṅ: kaccij jīvati "Is he alive, I hope?" The Tattvabodhinī supplies "my wish" here as well. It adds that the laṭ jīvati comes by SK 2789, the present for what is near the present.
Why name kaccit at all? The Bālamanoramā answers. A question with kaccit already shows a wish, so this rule would apply. And SK 2814, for verbs of desire, cannot apply, because kaccit does not mean "wish".
Rule. liṅ comes in the sense of sambhāvana, crediting someone with an ability. The ability must be of the kind "he is equal to it" (alam). And the word alam itself must not be used, though its sense is understood. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss supplies liṅ (it continues from SK 2809).
Bhaṭṭoji explains alam here as prauḍhi, "being equal to a task". The Bālamanoramā glosses it as "adequacy".
Example.
a strong man; the speaker credits him with the strength; alam is not said
→ liṅ of bhid "to split" (this rule) → api giriṃ śirasā bhindyāt
"He might even split a mountain with his head."
The Bālamanoramā calls this a hyperbole about a strong man. The word api shows that the crediting rests on his strength.
Applies when / blocked by. If the word alam is spoken, the rule does not apply: alaṃ kṛṣṇo hastinaṃ haniṣyati "Kṛṣṇa is equal to killing the elephant". The verb stays in the ordinary future, haniṣyati.
From SK 2809 on, lṛṅ is obligatory where the action failed. The Tattvabodhinī gives api giriṃ śirasābhetsyat "he would have split even a mountain with his head".
Watch out. The sūtra's words do two jobs each. Bhaṭṭoji says that sambhāvane is recast as sambhāvanam, and alam as alami. Both commentators explain how. Each word is repeated (āvṛtti), and one copy is recast in a new case. So sambhāvane names the sense of liṅ. sambhāvanam … alam says what kind of crediting it is. alami … siddhāprayoge says that the word alam is not used. The two commentators define sambhāvana in different words, and read iti differently; scholars discuss this.
Rule. When a root meaning "to credit with ability" is the upapada, liṅ comes optionally. An upapada is a word standing with the verb in the sentence, which a rule names as its condition. This option does not hold when yad "that" is the upapada. The sense is the one of SK 2811, which is carried forward.
In the other option lṛṭ comes. The Bālamanoramā takes it from SK 2808, śeṣe lṛḍ ayadau.
Bhaṭṭoji says why the rule is made: "because [liṅ] would obtain obligatorily by the preceding [rule]". SK 2811 alone would allow only liṅ.
Example.
sambhāvayāmi "I credit [you]" as upapada + bhuj "to eat"
→ liṅ optionally (this rule) → sambhāvayāmi bhuñjīta bhavān
→ or lṛṭ (SK 2808) → sambhāvayāmi bhokṣyate bhavān
"I credit you with being able to eat." The Bālamanoramā: "he is probably able to eat".
Applies when / blocked by. With yad, the option goes: sambhāvayāmi yad bhuñjīthās tvam. Here liṅ is obligatory, by SK 2811. The Tattvabodhinī says so.
Why does the sūtra say "root" (dhātau)? The Tattvabodhinī answers. Without it, the word sambhāvana itself might count as the upapada. Because the sūtra says "root", the option needs a verb such as sambhāvayāmi. Where only the word sambhāvana stands, liṅ is obligatory by SK 2811: bhuñjīta bhavān.
Rule. liṅ comes optionally after a root that stands for a cause (hetu), or for its result (hetumat, "what has the cause"). "Optionally" is carried forward from SK 2812. Bhaṭṭoji writes vā syāt, "comes optionally". In the other option lṛṭ comes, the Bālamanoramā says.
Example.
cause: bowing to Kṛṣṇa; result: reaching happiness
→ liṅ for both (this rule) → kṛṣṇaṃ namec cet sukhaṃ yāyāt
"If he should bow to Kṛṣṇa, he would attain happiness."
→ or lṛṭ for both → kṛṣṇaṃ naṃsyati cet sukhaṃ yāsyati
"If he bows to Kṛṣṇa, he will attain happiness."
The Tattvabodhinī: bowing to Kṛṣṇa is the cause of attaining happiness.
Applies when / blocked by. A vārttika limits the rule: bhaviṣyaty eveṣyate, "it is wanted only for the future". A vārttika is a supplementary statement on a sūtra. So the rule does not apply in hantīti palāyate "he runs away because [the other] is killing". The killing is in the present, not the future.
Both commentators tie the vārttika to the sūtra's wording. liṅ was already carried forward, yet the sūtra names it again. Naming it again, they say, conveys a particular time.
Watch out. hetumat here means the result of a cause. In SK 2576 (chapter 54) the same word named the prompter's activity in the causative. The word is the same; the sense differs with the rule.
Rule. When a verb meaning "to wish" is the upapada, liṅ and loṭ come after the root. Both commentators add that the two actions have different agents. Both call the rule an exception to all the lakāras.
Example.
icchāmi "I wish" as upapada; you are to eat (two agents)
→ liṅ (this rule) → icchāmi bhuñjīta bhavān
→ or loṭ (this rule) → icchāmi bhuṅktāṃ bhavān
"I wish that you would eat."
Bhaṭṭoji: the same holds with kāmaye "I desire", prārthaye "I request" and so on.
Applies when / blocked by. A vārttika adds a condition: kāmapravedana iti vaktavyam, "it should be stated: when one's wish is made known". The Bālamanoramā adds "to another". So the rule does not apply in icchan karoti "he does it, wishing". No wish is disclosed to anyone there.
How does this differ from SK 2810? Both commentators answer. SK 2810 covers a wish understood from context, with no verb of desire used. This rule covers a verb of desire as upapada.
Watch out. liṅ already comes by SK 2810 in a disclosed wish. Why name it again here? The Tattvabodhinī answers: otherwise loṭ, taught here, would block it.
Rule. When a verb of desire is the upapada and both actions have the same agent, liṅ comes. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "when [roots] meaning desire, having the same agent, are upapada, liṅ [comes]."
The condition "same agent" (samānakartṛka) comes from the sūtra just before this one. That is samānakartṛkeṣu tumun (A 3.3.158), which Bhaṭṭoji teaches later as SK 3176, in chapter 69. "Verbs of desire" comes from SK 2814.
Example.
he wishes; he himself is to eat (one agent)
→ liṅ, first person (this rule) → bhuñjīya
→ bhuñjīyeti icchati "He wishes, 'may I eat'."
The eater is himself the one who wishes.
Applies when / blocked by. The Tattvabodhinī explains the rule as a counter-exception (pratiprasava), a rule that restores what an exception had removed. With one agent, SK 3176 would bring the affix tumun and block SK 2814. This sūtra brings liṅ back.
Watch out. Only liṅ is restored, not loṭ. The Tattvabodhinī says so, and the Bālamanoramā says the rule is made "so that loṭ ceases".
Rule. After the verbs of desire themselves, liṅ comes optionally in the present. In the other option laṭ comes. Here the verb of desire takes the liṅ; in SK 2814–2815 it was only the upapada.
Example.
"he wishes", present time
→ liṅ (this rule) → icchet
→ or laṭ → icchati.
"he desires", present time → kāmayeta or kāmayate.
Applies when / blocked by. The Tattvabodhinī asks: why "after verbs of desire"? Because other verbs, like pacati "he cooks" and gacchati "he goes", have only laṭ in the present.
Bhaṭṭoji then recalls a rule. The next Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtra is SK 2208, which you know from chapter 44: vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhīṣṭasaṃpraśnaprārthaneṣu liṅ. Bhaṭṭoji recalls it here with its six senses. The Bālamanoramā says it is recalled because it comes next in the order. The senses and Bhaṭṭoji's examples:
yajeta "one should sacrifice";iha bhuñjīta bhavān "please eat here";iha āsīta "you may sit here";putram adhyāpayed bhavān "would you kindly teach [my] son";kiṃ bho vedam adhīyīya uta tarkam "sir, should I study the Veda or logic?";bhojanaṃ labheya "may I get food".Then Bhaṭṭoji adds evaṃ loṭ, "loṭ likewise". This recalls loṭ ca (SK 2194): loṭ comes in the same six senses.
bhavatā yaṣṭavyam (kṛtya) / bhavān yajatām (loṭ) → muhūrtād ūrdhvaṃ yajeta / yajatām / yaṣṭavyam → ūrdhvaṃ muhūrtād yajatāṃ smaThis group is about telling someone to act. It brings in the kṛtya affixes beside liṅ and loṭ. A kṛtya affix makes a word meaning "to be done", such as yaṣṭavyam "to be sacrificed"; the kṛtyas are taught in the kṛt section. The running example is yaj "to sacrifice". bhavatā yaṣṭavyam "it is to be sacrificed by you" uses a kṛtya. bhavān yajatām "let your honour sacrifice" uses loṭ. For an action due after a muhūrta, a period of the day, liṅ joins them (SK 2818). With sma, only loṭ remains. The group then turns to liṅ with yad and "time", and to a fit or able agent.
Rule. In three senses the kṛtya affixes come, and by ca "and", loṭ. The senses are praiṣa, atisarga and prāptakāla.
Bhaṭṭoji defines the first two:
The third, prāptakāla, means "the time [for the action] has come".
loṭ is drawn in from loṭ ca (SK 2194). Drawing in a word by ca is called anukarṣaṇa.
Example.
yaj "to sacrifice", in praiṣa or atisarga
→ a kṛtya affix, tavya (this rule) → bhavatā yaṣṭavyam "it is to be sacrificed by you"
→ or loṭ (by ca) → bhavān yajatām "let your honour sacrifice".
Applies when / blocked by. Bhaṭṭoji says the ca that draws in loṭ is "for the sake of prāptakāla". Both commentators explain why. In praiṣa and atisarga, loṭ already comes by SK 2194. In prāptakāla it did not, so the ca is needed there. The Bālamanoramā's example for prāptakāla is guruṇā bhoktavyam "the time for the teacher's eating has come".
Watch out. Why say praiṣa and not simply vidhi? The Tattvabodhinī reports the answer that it makes the meaning clearer for pupils.
Rule. In the same three senses, liṅ comes when the action belongs to the time after a muhūrta. A muhūrta is a period of the day. ūrdhvamauhūrtika means "belonging to [the time] after a muhūrta". By ca, the kṛtyas and loṭ of SK 2817 still come too.
Bhaṭṭoji says praiṣa and the rest are carried forward from SK 2817.
Example.
yaj, the action to be done after a muhūrta
→ liṅ (this rule) → muhūrtād ūrdhvaṃ yajeta
→ or loṭ → muhūrtād ūrdhvaṃ yajatām
→ or a kṛtya → yaṣṭavyam
"After a muhūrta, you should sacrifice."
Applies when / blocked by. What is new here? Both commentators answer: liṅ in prāptakāla. SK 2208 already gives liṅ in praiṣa and atisarga, but it does not name prāptakāla. Both commentators add the point of ca. liṅ alone would block loṭ and the kṛtyas, so ca keeps them.
Watch out. SK 2788 has the same words, liṅ cordhvamauhūrtike. It is a different sūtra (A 3.3.9). There the condition is a root that marks loṭ's meaning, and the rule works on the future.
Rule. With sma, only loṭ comes. Bhaṭṭoji places it "in the domain of the preceding sūtra". So the three senses and "after a muhūrta" both still hold; the Tattvabodhinī says both are carried forward.
Bhaṭṭoji calls it an exception to liṅ and to the kṛtyas.
Example.
yaj, after a muhūrta, with sma
→ loṭ only (this rule) → ūrdhvaṃ muhūrtād yajatāṃ sma
"After a muhūrta, do sacrifice."
The Bālamanoramā: here neither liṅ nor a kṛtya comes.
Rule. With sma, loṭ comes in adhīṣṭa, respectful urging. "With sma" is carried forward from SK 2819. "After a muhūrta" no longer applies.
Both commentators call it an exception to liṅ; the Bālamanoramā specifies the liṅ given in adhīṣṭa (SK 2208). It explains adhīṣṭa as an act preceded by respectful treatment.
Example.
a request to one's teacher, with sma
→ loṭ of adhyāpaya "teach" (this rule) → tvaṃ sma adhyāpaya
"Do teach, [sir]." The Bālamanoramā says it is said to a teacher.
Applies when / blocked by. One sūtra, sme loḍ adhīṣṭe ca, would have given the same forms. Why two? Both commentators answer: the split (yogavibhāga) stops "after a muhūrta" from carrying on. So in respectful urging that condition does not apply.
The next Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtra, kālasamayavelāsu tumun (A 3.3.167), is taught later, as SK 3179 in chapter 69. The Bālamanoramā notes this.
Rule. When yad is the upapada together with kāla "time", samaya "occasion" or velā "hour", liṅ comes. The three words are carried forward from kālasamayavelāsu tumun (SK 3179). Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "when the word yad is upapada, and kāla, samaya, velā, liṅ comes."
Both commentators call it an exception to tumun; the Bālamanoramā adds, to all the lakāras.
Example.
kāla + yad + bhuj "to eat"
→ liṅ (this rule) → kālaḥ samayo velā vā yad bhuñjīta bhavān
"It is time, the occasion, or the hour, that you should eat."
The Bālamanoramā construes: "that you should eat — that is its time".
Applies when / blocked by. The Tattvabodhinī carries praiṣa and the rest into this rule as well. So in yatkālaḥ pacati there is no liṅ, it says. Bhaṭṭoji does not state this, and the Bālamanoramā is silent.
Rule. When a fit agent (arha) is understood, the kṛtya affixes and tṛc come. By ca, liṅ comes as well. tṛc is the affix of voḍhā, given below. Bhaṭṭoji writes only cāl liṅ, "by ca, liṅ".
Example.
vah "to carry, to marry"; you are fit to do it
→ liṅ (by ca) → tvaṃ kanyāṃ vaheḥ
"You are fit to marry the girl."
The Tattvabodhinī gives the forms of the other affixes:
→ a kṛtya → tvayā kanyā voḍhavyā or vahanīyā
→ tṛc → tvaṃ kanyāṃ voḍhā.
Applies when / blocked by. The kṛtyas and tṛc already come by their own rules. Why name them here? The Tattvabodhinī reports the answer. The new thing is liṅ for fitness. The other affixes are named so that this liṅ does not block them.
Rule. In the sense of capability (śak), liṅ comes. By ca, the kṛtya affixes come too. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "liṅ comes in [the sense of] capability; by ca, the kṛtyas."
The Bālamanoramā explains śak as a noun of the bare action, "being able". So the rule applies when capability is understood.
Example.
vah "to carry"; you are able to do it
→ liṅ (this rule) → tvaṃ bhāraṃ vaheḥ
"You are able to carry the load."
Bhaṭṭoji then recalls, in its place in the order, māṅi luṅ (SK 2219), from chapter 44. With the particle māṅ, luṅ comes: mā kārṣīḥ "do not do [it]".
Then he asks: how are mā bhavatu "let it not be" and mā bhaviṣyati "it will not be" correct? The luṅ after māṅ is an exception to all the lakāras. His answer: "this is not māṅ; it is the word mā." The Bālamanoramā adds that mā without the marker ṅ is also listed among the indeclinables.
Is māṅi luṅ then needed? The Bālamanoramā says yes. na māṅyoge (SK 2228) gives luṅ forms without the augment aṭ or āṭ after māṅ. māṅi luṅ is needed so that those forms are used in the domain of every lakāra.
Watch out. vaheḥ also appeared in SK 2822. There it meant "you are fit to"; here it means "you are able to". The form is the same; the rule and the sense differ.
vasan dadarśa ("dwelling, he saw": laṭ, replaced by śatṛ, for the past)This group has one sūtra. It answers a puzzle. In vasan dadarśa "dwelling, he saw", vasan is built on laṭ, the present. Yet the dwelling was in the past. SK 2824 allows it. When two actions are related, an affix taught for one time may stand for another. The subordinate action follows the time of the main verb.
Rule. When the meanings of two roots are related, an affix taught for one time may also come in another. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "when there is a relation between the meanings of roots, the affixes [that have been] stated for a particular time may come in another [time] too."
Which affix shifts? Bhaṭṭoji answers. The action expressed by the finite verb (the tiṅ-form) is the principal one (pradhāna). So the affixes shift after the root of the subordinate action (guṇabhūta), to conform to the principal.
Example.
vas "to dwell" (subordinate) + dṛś "to see" (principal, in liṭ: dadarśa)
→ laṭ after vas in the past (this rule), replaced by the affix śatṛ → vasan
→ vasan dadarśa "dwelling, he saw".
Bhaṭṭoji gives the meaning: "a seeing whose agent is the agent of a past dwelling". Both commentators restate it as uṣitvā dadarśa "having dwelt, he saw".
Bhaṭṭoji's second example:
somayājy asya putro bhavitā "a son of his will be a soma-sacrificer".
The affix ṇini in somayājī is taught for the past by karaṇe yajaḥ (SK 2996, chapter 67). The Bālamanoramā says it is read here as future, to fit the luṭ form bhavitā. Bhaṭṭoji gives the meaning: a coming into being whose agent is the son who will sacrifice with soma.
Applies when / blocked by. Why does the liṭ of dadarśa not shift to the present instead? Both commentators answer. The Bālamanoramā: the seeing is the principal action; the dwelling serves it. Both put the rule the same way: the subordinate is brought into line with the principal, not the reverse.
Watch out. "dhātu" in the sūtra means the root's meaning, not two roots actually spoken. Both commentators say so. Both commentators add gomān āsīt "he was an owner of cows". The affix matup is taught for a present "is"; here it stands with a past "was". No second root sits beside āsīt, yet the two meanings are related.
yāhi yāhīti yāti (kriyāsamabhihāra: "he keeps going") and saktūn piba dhānāḥ khādety abhyavaharati (samuccaya: "'drink the gruel, chew the grain' — thus he takes his meal")The last group uses loṭ in two new ways. In the first, an action is repeated or intense (kriyāsamabhihāra). In the second, several actions are gathered together (samuccaya). In both, hi or sva stands in place of loṭ. They carry no person or number, so a finite verb must follow to supply them. For repetition, that verb is the same root: yāhi yāhīti yāti "'go, go!' — so he goes", that is, he keeps going. For aggregation, it is a root of general meaning: saktūn piba dhānāḥ khādety abhyavaharati "'drink the gruel, chew the grain' — thus he takes his meal". Bhaṭṭoji gives all the forms under SK 2828.
Rule. The sūtra has three clauses.
Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "when repetition or intensity is to be made known, loṭ comes after a root, and in its place hi and sva come — an exception to the tiṅ."
Repetition is paunaḥpunya, "again and again". Intensity is bhṛśārtha. Both commentators add that the repetition is the root's own meaning; loṭ only makes it known.
Example.
yā "to go", the going repeated
→ loṭ (this rule) → hi in its place (this rule) → yāhi.
adhi-i "to study", the studying repeated
→ loṭ → sva in its place → adhīṣva.
The full sentences, with the doubling and the following verb, are under SK 2828.
Applies when / blocked by. What are hi and sva? Bhaṭṭoji says hi is named parasmaipada and sva ātmanepada. Both are also named tiṅ. Both commentators say this makes the form a word (pada). The Bālamanoramā says they are treated like the familiar loṭ endings hi and sva.
ta and dhvam are the second person plural endings, both commentators say. Where ta or dhvam would come, hi and sva still replace the loṭ, but only optionally. In the other option ta and dhvam themselves stand: yāta, adhīdhvam. The Bālamanoramā adds that hi and sva never replace ta and dhvam themselves.
Watch out. hi and sva do not take the names of person or of singular. Bhaṭṭoji gives the reason: otherwise prescribing them would be pointless. The Bālamanoramā adds the Bhāṣya's word: hi and sva are wanted for all persons and numbers. So:
Rule. When an aggregation (samuccaya) of several actions is to be made known, what SK 2825 taught comes optionally. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "when the aggregation of several actions is to be made known, what was stated before comes optionally."
What was stated before? Both commentators list it: loṭ after the root, hi and sva in its place, and the option for ta and dhvam. The Bālamanoramā adds that samabhihāre, the word for repetition, is not carried forward.
Example.
two actions gathered: drinking the gruel, chewing the grain
→ loṭ, then hi (this rule) → piba, khāda
→ saktūn piba dhānāḥ khāda … (completed under SK 2828).
In the other option there is no loṭ: saktūn pibati, dhānāḥ khādati "he drinks the gruel, he chews the grain".
Applies when / blocked by. The Bālamanoramā says the word kriyā "action" is carried forward from SK 2825. So the rule gathers actions only. It does not apply to a gathering of participants in an action.
Rule. In the first of the two loṭ rules, SK 2825, the root used afterwards must be the root that took the loṭ. The use of a verb afterwards is called anuprayoga. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "in the first prescription of loṭ, only the root that is the base of the loṭ is to be used afterwards."
Example.
yāhi yāhi (loṭ of yā)
→ the verb used afterwards is yā again (this rule) → yāhi yāhīti yāti.
The Tattvabodhinī: not gacchati, though it too means "goes".
Applies when / blocked by. Why use a verb afterwards at all? The Tattvabodhinī answers. The hi-form or sva-form does not show number, participant or time. So a following verb is needed anyway; this sūtra only fixes which root it is.
"Afterwards" need not mean "right next to it". The Bālamanoramā cites the Bhāṣya's own usage, lunīhi lunīhīty evāyaṃ lunāti, where evāyam comes between. The Tattvabodhinī reports that the Bhāṣya rejects this sūtra as unneeded.
Rule. In the loṭ rule for aggregation, SK 2826, the root used afterwards is one of general meaning. It must cover all the gathered actions. Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "when loṭ is prescribed for aggregation, there is subsequent use of a root with a general meaning."
Bhaṭṭoji adds how the sentence is completed. After that root come laṭ or another lakāra, and tip or another ending, as the case requires. They make the number, the time and the person clear.
A vārttika then adds the doubling: kriyāsamabhihāre dve vācye, "in repetition, doubling is to be stated". The Bālamanoramā, citing the Bhāṣya, says it applies to the loṭ-form of SK 2825. Both commentators say it is explained in the section on doubling.
Example. Repetition (SK 2825, 2827), with doubling:
yā + loṭ → yāhi (SK 2825)
→ doubled (the vārttika) → yāhi yāhi
→ iti, then the same root (SK 2827) in laṭ → yāhi yāhīti yāti
"'Go, go!' — so he goes": he keeps going.
Bhaṭṭoji splits the meaning. yāhi yāhi means going again and again, or intensely. yāti means one agent's going in the present. iti shows that the two are construed as one and the same going (abhedānvaya, construal of identity).
The same with other persons and numbers: yāhi yāhīti yātaḥ, yānti, yāsi, yāthaḥ, yātha.
In the second plural, the other option keeps the ending ta: yāta yāteti yūyaṃ yātha "you [all] keep going".
In other lakāras: yāhi yāhīty ayāsīt (luṅ) "he kept going", or yāsyati (lṛṭ) "he will keep going".
With sva: adhīṣva adhīṣvety adhīte "he keeps studying".
In the second plural, the other option keeps dhvam: adhīdhvam adhīdhvam iti yūyam adhīdhve "you [all] keep studying".
Aggregation (SK 2826, 2828), with no doubling:
pā "to drink" and khād "to chew" → loṭ, hi (SK 2826) → piba, khāda
→ iti, then a root of general meaning (this rule): abhyavaharati "he takes a meal"
→ saktūn piba dhānāḥ khādety abhyavaharati
"'Drink the barley-gruel, chew the parched grain' — thus he takes his meal."
The Bālamanoramā explains the words. Drinking is taking a liquid without chewing. Chewing is for solid food. Taking a meal is the general act that covers both.
With sva: annaṃ bhuṅkṣva dādhikam āsvādayasvety abhyavaharate "'eat the rice, relish the curd-dish' — thus he takes his meal".
In the second plural, with ta and dhvam:
pibata khādatety abhyavaharatha;bhuṅgdhvam āsvādayadhvam ity abhyavaharadhve (the printed text reads bhuṅdhvam).In the other option, hi and sva. The Tattvabodhinī gives piba khādety abhyavaharatha and bhuṅkṣva āsvādayasvety abhyavaharadhve.
Bhaṭṭoji: the gathered actions are construed as one with the general action. Without loṭ: saktūn pibati, dhānāḥ khādati; annaṃ bhuṅkte, dādhikam āsvādayate.
Applies when / blocked by. By these rules Bhaṭṭoji explains a verse. The Bālamanoramā ascribes it to Māgha's poem:
purīm avaskanda lunīhi nandanaṃ muṣāṇa ratnāni harāmarāṅganāḥ / vigṛhya cakre namucidviṣā balī ya ittham asvāsthyam ahardivaṃ divaḥ
"The mighty one who, warring with the enemy of Namuci, day after day caused heaven's disquiet thus: 'storm the city, cut down Nandana, plunder the jewels, carry off the women of the immortals'." The Bālamanoramā identifies the mighty one as Rāvaṇa and the enemy of Namuci as Indra.
Here avaskanda, lunīhi, muṣāṇa and hara are aggregation loṭ. The general verb used afterwards is asvāsthyaṃ cakre "caused disquiet". Bhaṭṭoji gives its sense: the act of disquieting, made up of storming, cutting down and the rest. It is past, not of today, out of the speaker's sight, with one agent.
Watch out. Bhaṭṭoji rejects two readings of the verse.
With this the section on the meanings of the lakāras ends. Two closing lines (colophons) follow. The first ends the lakārārtha section. The second says that the whole tiṅanta, the verb, is complete. Chapter 66 begins the kṛdanta, words formed with kṛt affixes, with dhātoḥ (SK 2829).
yaṣṭavyam, voḍhavyā (SK 2817, 2822, 2823).voḍhā, which comes beside the kṛtyas for a fit agent (SK 2822).mā bhavatu (SK 2823).vasan (SK 2824).somayājī and gomān, shifted in time by SK 2824.| SK | what it does | example |
|---|---|---|
| 2773 | lṛṭ for the past not of today, with a word of recollection | smarasi kṛṣṇa gokule vatsyāmaḥ |
| 2774 | not with yad: laṅ returns | abhijānāsi kṛṣṇa yad vane 'bhuñjmahi |
| 2775 | lṛṭ optional when the actions mark each other, even with yad; parokṣe liṭ recalled; liṭ in total denial | vane vatsyāmas tatra gāś cārayiṣyāmaḥ; nāhaṃ kaliṅgān jagāma |
| 2776 | with ha, śaśvat: laṅ as well as liṭ | iti hākarot / cakāra |
| 2777 | in a question about recent time: laṅ and liṭ | agacchat kim / jagāma kim |
| 2778 | with sma: laṭ in the field of liṭ | yajati sma yudhiṣṭhiraḥ |
| 2779 | with sma: laṭ also when not beyond perception | evaṃ sma pitā bravīti |
| 2780 | in a reply with nanu: laṭ in the past | nanu karomi bhoḥ |
| 2781 | with na or nu: laṭ in the past, optionally | na karomi / nākārṣam |
| 2782 | with purā: luṅ and laṭ, optionally; not with sma | vasantīha purā chātrāḥ / avātsuḥ / avasan / ūṣuḥ |
| 2783 | with the nipātas yāvat, purā: laṭ for the future | yāvad bhuṅkte |
| 2784 | with kadā, karhi: laṭ for the future, optionally | kadā bhuṅkte / bhokṣyate / bhoktā |
| 2785 | with a form of kim and a wish to obtain: laṭ, optionally | kaṃ bhojayasi / bhojayiṣyasi / bhojayitāsi |
| 2786 | an end gained through what is sought: laṭ, optionally | yo 'nnaṃ dadāti sa svargaṃ yāti |
| 2787 | a sense marking loṭ's meaning: laṭ, optionally | kṛṣṇaś ced bhuṅkte tvaṃ gāś cāraya |
| 2788 | after a muhūrta, in the same sense: liṅ and laṭ, optionally | upādhyāyaś ced āgacchet / āgacchati |
| 2789 | a time near the present: suffixes as for the present, optionally | ayam āgacchāmi; eṣa gacchāmi |
| 2790 | in hope: as for the past or the present, optionally; no laṅ, liṭ | devaś ced avarṣīt, dhānyam avāpsma |
| 2791 | in hope, with "quickly": lṛṭ, even in luṭ's field | śvaḥ śīghraṃ vapsyāmaḥ |
| 2792 | with a word of hope: liṅ, not as for the past | gurus ced upeyād āśaṃse 'dhīyīya |
| 2793 | continuity or proximity: no laṅ, no luṭ | yāvajjīvam annam adāt / dāsyati |
| 2794 | future, stated limit, nearer part: no luṭ | … avaraṃ kauśāmbyās tatra saktūn pāsyāmaḥ |
| 2795 | the same for a division of time, but not of days and nights | … avaram āgrahāyaṇyās tatra yuktā adhyeṣyāmahe |
| 2796 | farther part: the bar optional; liṅnimitte lṛṅ kriyātipattau recalled | adhyeṣyāmahe / adhyetāsmahe; suvṛṣṭiś ced abhaviṣyat |
| 2797 | heading: lṛṅ in non-accomplishment in the past too | — |
| 2798 | heading: in the past, lṛṅ optional up to SK 2809 | — |
| 2799 | censure with api, jātu: laṭ in the three times | api jāyāṃ tyajasi |
| 2800 | censure with katham: liṅ and laṭ, optionally | kathaṃ dharmaṃ tyajeḥ / tyajasi; atyakṣyat |
| 2801 | censure with a form of kim: liṅ and lṛṭ | kaḥ kataraḥ katamo vā hariṃ nindet / nindiṣyati |
| 2802 | incredibility, intolerance: liṅ and lṛṭ, even without kim | bhavān hariṃ nindet / nindiṣyati |
| 2803 | with kiṃkila or "is": lṛṭ only; no lṛṅ | kiṃkila tvaṃ śūdrānnaṃ bhokṣyase |
| 2804 | with jātu, yad (and yadā, yadi): liṅ only | jātu tvādṛśo hariṃ nindet |
| 2805 | with yac ca, yatra: liṅ | yac ca tvam evaṃ kuryāḥ |
| 2806 | censure with yac ca, yatra: liṅ alone | yac ca tvaṃ śūdraṃ yājayeḥ (improper) |
| 2807 | astonishment with yac ca, yatra: liṅ | yac ca tvaṃ śūdraṃ yājayeḥ (astonishing) |
| 2808 | astonishment with another word: lṛṭ; not with yadi | āścaryam andho nāma kṛṣṇaṃ drakṣyati |
| 2809 | liṅ with uta / api meaning "certainly"; from here lṛṅ is obligatory in the past too | uta / api hanyād aghaṃ hariḥ; but uta daṇḍaḥ patiṣyati |
| 2810 | liṅ when one's own wish is made known, not with kaccit | kāmo me bhuñjīta bhavān; but kaccij jīvati |
| 2811 | liṅ in crediting with ability, when alam is understood but not said | api giriṃ śirasā bhindyāt; but alaṃ kṛṣṇo hastinaṃ haniṣyati |
| 2812 | With a verb of crediting as upapada, liṅ optional (else lṛṭ), not with yad | sambhāvayāmi bhuñjīta / bhokṣyate vā bhavān |
| 2813 | liṅ optionally for a cause and its result, future only | kṛṣṇaṃ namec cet sukhaṃ yāyāt; but hantīti palāyate |
| 2814 | liṅ and loṭ with a verb of desire as upapada, different agents | icchāmi bhuñjīta / bhuṅktāṃ vā bhavān |
| 2815 | liṅ (not loṭ) with a verb of desire, same agent | bhuñjīyeti icchati |
| 2816 | liṅ optionally in the present after verbs of desire; SK 2208 and SK 2194 recalled | icchet / icchati; yajeta |
| 2817 | Kṛtyas and loṭ in praiṣa, atisarga, prāptakāla | bhavatā yaṣṭavyam; bhavān yajatām |
| 2818 | liṅ too, after a muhūrta, in those senses | muhūrtād ūrdhvaṃ yajeta / yajatām / yaṣṭavyam |
| 2819 | With sma, only loṭ there | ūrdhvaṃ muhūrtād yajatāṃ sma |
| 2820 | With sma, loṭ in respectful urging | tvaṃ sma adhyāpaya |
| 2821 | liṅ with yad and kāla / samaya / velā | kālaḥ samayo velā vā yad bhuñjīta bhavān |
| 2822 | Kṛtyas, tṛc and liṅ for a fit agent | tvaṃ kanyāṃ vaheḥ; voḍhavyā, voḍhā |
| 2823 | liṅ and kṛtyas in capability; SK 2219 recalled | tvaṃ bhāraṃ vaheḥ; mā kārṣīḥ |
| 2824 | When root-meanings are related, an affix of one time stands for another | vasan dadarśa; somayājy asya putro bhavitā |
| 2825 | loṭ in repetition or intensity; hi / sva for it; optional for ta, dhvam | yāhi, adhīṣva |
| 2826 | The same, optionally, for an aggregation of actions | piba, khāda |
| 2827 | In repetition, the following verb is the loṭ's own root | yāhi yāhīti yāti, not gacchati |
| 2828 | In aggregation, the following verb has a general meaning; doubling in repetition | saktūn piba dhānāḥ khādety abhyavaharati |