Rule. An agent whose action is like the action residing in the object is treated like the object (karmavat). Bhaṭṭoji's gloss: "an agent whose action is similar to the action residing in the object (karmastha) is treated like the object".
Two things are supplied. "Agent" (kartari) is carried forward from SK 2167, kartari śap, and recast in the first case. Bhaṭṭoji's commentators agree on this. And only an agent denoted by the lakāra is meant; Bhaṭṭoji explains this below.
Bhaṭṭoji then says: "This is an extension of operations (kāryātideśa)." An atideśa is a rule that says "treat this like that". Here the agent receives the operations that an object would bring. Bhaṭṭoji lists them: yak, the ātmanepada, ciṇ and the ciṇvat iṭ. One of his commentators names the rule for each: yak by SK 2756, the ātmanepada by SK 2679, ciṇ by SK 2758, the ciṇvat iṭ by SK 2757.
Example.
"[Someone] cooks the rice": odanaṃ pacati. The rice is the object.
→ the cook's activity is not meant; the rice is meant as the agent
→ pac + laṭ, the lakāra in the sense of the agent, the rice
→ this rule: that agent is treated like the object
→ so the ātmanepada comes (SK 2679): the ending ta, made te by SK 2233 → pac + te
→ so yak comes before the sārvadhātuka ending (SK 2756) → pac + ya + te
→ pacyate.
Bhaṭṭoji: "because the agent is expressed, it takes the first case". The ending expresses it, so the noun is nominative: pacyate odanaḥ, "the rice cooks [by itself]". Likewise bhidyate kāṣṭham, "the wood splits [by itself]".
One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators describes the scene. The rice softens without any special effort of a person, such as blowing on the fire. The wood splits in two without a firm blow of the axe.
In the aorist:
pac + luṅ → cli
→ the agent is treated like the object, so ciṇ replaces cli before ta (SK 2758) → pac + ciṇ + ta
→ the penultimate a takes vṛddhi before the ṇ-marked ciṇ (SK 2282) → pāc + i + ta
→ ta is deleted after ciṇ (SK 2329); the augment aṭ (SK 2206) → apāci.
Likewise from bhid, with guṇa of the light penultimate (SK 2189): abhedi.
With the ciṇvat iṭ in the future (lṛṭ): kāriṣyate ghaṭaḥ, "the pot will get made [of itself]". This example is explained below.
Applies when / blocked by. Why "-vat", "like"? Both of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators answer. Without -vat the rule could be read as naming the agent "karman". Then the root would stay transitive. The impersonal pacyate odanena would be impossible, because a transitive root takes no lakāra in the bare-action sense.
Why an extension of operations? Both commentators contrast it with an extension of rules (śāstrātideśa). The two give the same result. But a rule exists for the sake of its operation. So the extension of operations is the primary one, and it is adopted.
Only the agent the lakāra denotes. Bhaṭṭoji raises an objection. When the lakāra expresses the bare action, the agent is not expressed by the verb. Treated like an object, would it not take the second case? He answers no. Only an agent denoted by the lakāra is treated like the object. The letter "l" is carried forward from a sūtra-text with two l's: vyatyayo bahulam (SK 3433) read together with liṅy āśiṣy aṅ (SK 3434). How that second l arises, scholars discuss this. In the bare-action sense, the lakāra does not present the agent at all. So the agent is not treated like an object, and takes no second case.
Bhaṭṭoji draws a consequence. The kṛtya affixes, kta, and the affixes in the sense of khal never occur in the object-agent sense. They occur only in the bare-action sense: bhettavyaṃ kusūlena, "there is to be splitting on the part of the granary". Whether kta belongs on this list, scholars discuss this.
"Similar", though it is the same action? Bhaṭṭoji raises a second objection. For pac the action in the object is softening (viklitti). For bhid it is splitting in two (dvidhābhavana). That very action now resides in the agent. It is the same action, not one similar to it. Bhaṭṭoji answers: "True." But being object and being agent are two different states. That difference conditions a difference in the action that goes with them. The word "similar" rests on that. Both of his commentators call this difference conditioned (aupādhika), not real.
Why "karmaṇā", "to the object"? Bhaṭṭoji: so that the rule does not apply when the action is like that of an instrument or a locus. These are the opening examples, sādhv asiś chinatti and the rest. Both of his commentators explain the danger. The sword's activity in asinā chinatti, "he cuts with a sword", is the very activity that resides in the agent in asiś chinatti. Without "karmaṇā", the sword-agent too would be treated like the object.
Not for roots whose action resides in the agent. Bhaṭṭoji adds, "moreover": the rule does not apply to roots whose action resides in the agent (kartṛstha). So there is no yak in these:
gacchati grāmaḥ, "the village goes", that is, it is reached without effort;ārohati hastī, "the elephant mounts", that is, it lets itself be mounted;adhigacchati śāstrārthaḥ smarati śraddadhāti ca, "the meaning of the śāstra understands, remembers and believes", that is, it becomes understood, remembered and believed.
How do we know where an action resides? Bhaṭṭoji gives the test. Where the object shows a difference produced by the action (kriyākṛta viśeṣa), the action resides in the object. Cooked rice differs from uncooked rice; cut wood differs from uncut wood. A village that has been gone to looks no different from one that has not. So gam is an agent-residing root. One of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators adds that the agent operations, śap and the rest, apply in these examples.
Why kāriṣyate ghaṭaḥ works. Bhaṭṭoji: kṛ means producing (utpādana), and coming into being (utpatti) resides in the object. So kāriṣyate ghaṭaḥ, "the pot will get made [of itself]". If kṛ meant effort (yatna), this would fail. Effort, like knowing and desiring, resides in the agent. Bhaṭṭoji says "and so on" after the example. His commentators supply the other forms: kariṣyate without the ciṇvat iṭ, the aorist akāri / akṛta, and kriyate ghaṭaḥ svayam eva with yak.
Watch out. The word svayam often goes with these forms: pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva. Both of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators, following Kaiyaṭa, say what it means. It means "by itself as the means" (ātmanā karaṇena), not "by itself as the agent". If svayam named the agent, the lakāra would be in the object sense. So read it "of itself".
A second trap is the phrase anuvyavasyamāne 'rthe, "when the matter is being ascertained". It looks like an ātmanepada form of a karmakartṛ, but it is not. Ascertaining resides in the agent, so there is no yak. Śyan comes, and the o of the root is deleted (SK 2510). The -āna is cānaś (SK 3109, taught later), an affix for habit and the like. It is not an ātmanepada ending. Both of Bhaṭṭoji's commentators add that with yak the form would be anuvyavasīyamāna.
[Section on finite verbs (tiṅanta): the procedure of the object-agent (karmakartṛ-prakriyā), [no.] 61. When, to convey that [the action] is exceptionally easy (saukaryātiśaya), the activity (vyāpāra) of the agent is not meant to be expressed, then other kārakas too receive the designation agent (kartṛ), because they are independent (svatantra) in their own activity. So, although they formerly had the status of instrument (karaṇa) and the like, they are now agents, and the lakāra is in [the sense of] the agent (kartari): sādhv asiś chinatti ('the sword cuts well'); kāṣṭhāni pacanti ('the logs cook'); sthālī pacati ('the pot cooks'). When, however, the object (karman) is meant as the agent [— again to convey exceptional ease], [dhātus] that were formerly transitive (sakarmaka) are mostly (prāyeṇa) intransitive (akarmaka), and after them the lakāras come in [the sense of] the bare action (bhāve) and of the agent (kartari): pacyate odanena, bhidyate kāṣṭhena ([impersonal] 'there is cooking on the part of the rice', 'there is splitting on the part of the wood'). In [the sense of] the agent, however, [the following sūtra applies]:] An agent whose action is similar to the action residing in the object (karmastha) is treated like the object (karmavat). This is an extension of operations (kāryātideśa) [as opposed to an extension of rules (śāstrātideśa)]. By it, yak, ātmanepada, ciṇ and the ciṇvat iṭ (the iṭ augment as before ciṇ) come about. Because the agent is expressed [by the tiṅ], it takes the first case (prathamā): pacyate odanaḥ ('the rice cooks [by itself]'); bhidyate kāṣṭham ('the wood splits [by itself]'); apāci; abhedi. Objection: when the lakāra is in [the sense of] the bare action (bhāve), the agent would get the second case (dvitīyā) by this extension [since, treated like the object, it is not expressed by the verb]. — No. Only an agent denoted by the lakāra is treated like the object, because 'l' is carried forward (anuvṛtti) from the [sūtra-text] with two l's, 'vyatyayo bahulam' (SK 3433) 'liṅy āśiṣy aṅ' (SK 3434); and when the affix is in [the sense of] the bare action, the agent is not presented by the lakāra. For this very reason the kṛtya affixes, kta, and the affixes in the sense of khal do not occur in [the sense of] the object-agent (karmakartṛ), but only in [the sense of] the bare action: bhettavyaṃ kusūlena ([impersonal] 'there is to be splitting on the part of the granary'). Objection: for pac and bhid the action residing in the object is softening (viklitti) and splitting in two (dvidhābhavana) [respectively]. That very [action] now resides in the agent; it is not similar to it. — True. [But] the usage ['similar'] rests on a difference in the action that is co-located with them [i.e. with those states], a difference conditioned by the difference between the states (avasthā) of being object (karmatva) and being agent (kartṛtva). Why [does the sūtra say] "to the object" (karmaṇā)? So that it does not apply where [the agent's action] is similar to [that of] the instrument (karaṇa) or the locus (adhikaraṇa), as in sādhv asiḥ [chinatti] and the rest, cited above. Moreover: so that it does not apply to [dhātus] whose action resides in the agent (kartṛstha): gacchati grāmaḥ ('the village goes', i.e. is reached [without effort]); ārohati hastī ('the elephant mounts', i.e. lets itself be mounted); adhigacchati śāstrārthaḥ smarati śraddadhāti ca ('the meaning of the śāstra understands, remembers and believes', i.e. becomes understood, remembered and believed [of itself]). Where a distinction produced by the action (kriyākṛta viśeṣa) is seen in the object — as in cooked rice grains, or in cut pieces of wood — there the action resides in the object; not elsewhere. For no difference is observed between villages gone to and not gone to, as there is between cooked and uncooked rice grains. kṛ (karoti) has the sense of producing (utpādana), and coming into being (utpatti) resides in the object. Hence kāriṣyate ghaṭaḥ ('the pot will get made [of itself]') and so on. If [kṛ] had the sense of effort (yatna), this would not be established, because effort, like cognition, desire and the rest, resides in the agent. By this [reasoning] the [expression] anuvyavasyamāne 'rthe ('when the matter is being ascertained') is accounted for: since [the action] resides in the agent, there is no yak, and the form is achieved when śyan is added and the o is deleted. This [-āna] is cānaś, [prescribed] for habit (tācchīlya) and the rest, and not an ātmanepada [ending].
(vārttika) For [dhātus that remain] transitive (sakarmaka) the prohibition [of being treated like the object] must be stated.
anyonyaṃ spṛśataḥ ('the two touch each other'); ajā grāmaṃ nayati ('the goat leads [itself] to the village').
(vārttika) It must be stated that for duh and pac, [even when] transitive, [being treated like the object holds] variously (bahulam).
—
- textual Our unit opens with the sūtra. NSP p. 467–468 (scans page-0477 and page-0478, read; collation batch05) prints before it, in kaumudī type, the heading 'tiṅante karmakartṛprakriyā 61' and the whole opening paragraph 'yadā saukaryātiśayaṃ dyotayituṃ kartṛvyāpāro na vivakṣyate tadā kārakāntarāṇy api kartṛsaṃjñāṃ labhante | svavyāpāre svatantratvāt | tena pūrvaṃ karaṇatvādisattve 'pi saṃprati kartṛtvāt kartari lakāraḥ | sādhv asiś chinatti | kāṣṭhāni pacanti | sthālī pacati | karmaṇas tu kartṛtvavivakṣāyāṃ prāk sakarmakā api prāyeṇākarmakās tebhyo bhāve kartari ca lakārāḥ | pacyate odanena | bhidyate kāṣṭhena | kartari tu |'. All of it is missing from ours. The English supplies it in square brackets at the head of k1. Mūla, for Ajai's Print Check; source.json not edited. Bhaṭṭoji's own 'pūrvokte sādhvasir ityādau' later in k1 refers back to this paragraph.
- commentary TB on the opening paragraph (NSP p. 467, scan page-0477; in ours at the head of sk.2766.t1, re-filed from the tail of sk.2765.t1 on 2026-10-05; the OCR skips from 'karmaṇas tv iti' to '…sakarmakāṇām iti niṣedhe'): on 'karmaṇas tu', 'saukaryātiśayaṃ dyotayitum' is to be supplied again (anuṣaṅga); 'prāyeṇa' means that the single-object roots such as bhid and chid become intransitive, while the double-object (dvikarmaka) ones stay transitive; 'bhāve kartari ca' gives the result of being intransitive, by 'bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ' [SK 2152]. TB (print only) then cites dvikarmaka examples with the object as agent, 'mathnāti sāgaro 'mṛtam' and 'svayaṃ pradugdhe 'sya guṇair upasnutā vasūpamānasya vasūni medinī', and (in ours too, sk.2766.t1) reports and doubts the view that in dvikarmaka roots only the secondary (gauṇa) object can be meant as agent, since in ajā grāmaṃ nayati the primary object is so meant ('tac cintyam'), adding the case of rudh with vraja. Recorded. Followed: '[— again to convey exceptional ease]' and 'mostly' in the bracketed paragraph.
- commentary BM: 'kartari' is carried forward from 'kartari śap' [SK 2167] and recast in the first case; 'karmaṇā' means the action residing in the object-kāraka, since similarity of an action to a kāraka is possible only through the action residing in it. Without 'vat' the sūtra could be taken to give the designation karman, and then, the root being transitive, the impersonal pacyate odanena, bhidyate kāṣṭhena would be impossible. Followed: the anuvṛtti bracket in sutra_en and 'action residing in the object'.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) agrees: 'kartari' from 'kartari śap' recast in the first case as the qualificandum; 'karmaṇā' indicates the action residing in the object-kāraka; with plain 'karma' the sūtra would give the saṃjñā, the root would not count as akarmaka, and the lakāra could not be bhāve. Followed.
- commentary BM on 'kāryātideśo 'yam': although an extension of rules (śāstrātideśa) and an extension of operations give the same result, the extension of rules is itself for the sake of the operations, so the extension of operations is the primary one and is adopted. If the object as agent were not treated like the object, the rules enjoined for the agent would apply. Followed: 'extension of operations (kāryātideśa)'.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) on 'kāryātideśo 'yam': although the target form is reached by an extension of rules too, the rule itself serves the operation, so the extension of operations, being primary, is the one adopted. Followed.
- commentary BM on 'tena': the operations are yak by 'sārvadhātuke yak' [SK 2756], ātmanepada by 'bhāvakarmaṇoḥ' [SK 2679], ciṇ by 'ciṇ bhāvakarmaṇoḥ' [SK 2758], and the ciṇvat iṭ by 'syasicsīyuṭtāsiṣu…' [SK 2757], with the iṭ that is enjoined together with it. On 'kartur abhihitatvāt': the tiṅ that replaces the lakāra in the agent sense expresses the agent. Followed: '[by the tiṅ]'.
- commentary BM on pacyate odanaḥ / bhidyate kāṣṭham: the rice becomes the locus of softening without any special effort of a person such as blowing [on the fire]; the wood splits in two without a firm blow of an axe. The yak is from the extension of object-status; apāci, abhedi have ciṇ for the same reason. Followed: '[by itself]' in the glosses.
- commentary BM on 'dvilakārakāt': read in saṃhitā, 'vyatyayo bahulaṃl liṅy āśiṣy aṅ', another l, deleted by 'halo yamāṃ yami lopaḥ', is understood before the l [of liṅ]; from this two-l sūtra 'l' as a sixth-case word is carried into 'karmavat karmaṇā', and the sixth case means 'denoted by': 'the agent denoted by l is karmavat'. Followed: 'carried forward (anuvṛtti)' and 'denoted by the lakāra'.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) on 'dvilakārakāt' explains the two l's thus: in the saṃhitā reading the anusvāra [of bahulam] becomes l by assimilation to the following sound (parasavarṇa), giving two l's [above it], so that 'the agent denoted by the lakāra is karmavat' is obtained, and yak etc. result, not the second case. Followed for the anuvṛtti; the English names no mechanism for the two l's.
- commentary BM on 'ata eva': since only the karmakartṛ denoted by the lakāra is karmavat, kṛtya, kta and khal-sense affixes enjoined in the object sense cannot occur in the karmakartṛ; the Bhāṣya is clear on this. But, citing the Śabdenduśekhara, BM restricts the exclusion to the kta of 'niṣṭhā' [SK 3013] in the object sense: the kta enjoined in the agent sense by 'gatyarthākarmaka…' does occur in the karmakartṛ, hence the Bhāṣya's 'sino grāsaḥ svayam eva'. Recorded; the English keeps Bhaṭṭoji's unqualified statement.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) on 'na bhavanti': the karmakartṛ is presented by the lakāra itself, so kṛt affixes etc. have no scope (what is already expressed is not used again). TB then says the mention of kta in 'kṛtyaktakhalarthāḥ' ought to be dropped, since bhinnaḥ kusūlaḥ svayam eva is wanted, and Bhaṭṭoji himself cites sino grāsaḥ svayam eva under 'sinoter grāsakarmakartṛkasya'. Recorded; not followed in the English, which keeps Bhaṭṭoji's statement (§16).
- commentary BM on 'satyam': a partial concession (ardhāṅgīkāra). Softening and splitting were in the object and are now in the agent, but that does not mean there is no similarity: being object and being agent are two states (= particular properties); their difference is the condition (upādhi) for a difference in the action co-located with them, and the usage 'similar' rests on that. Though there is no real difference, there is a conditioned (aupādhika) one. Followed: 'True. [But] …' and the construal of the compound.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) on 'na tu tattulyā': similarity rests on difference, and there is none here, since the action that is the fruit residing in the object is itself in the agent, so the sūtra would be incoherent; on 'karmatva-': there is a conditioned (aupādhika) difference though no real one — a difference of action co-located with the difference of states, so the agent's action is similar to the object-residing action. Followed.
- commentary BM on 'karaṇādhikaraṇābhyām': the activity of the instrument and the locus in asinā chinatti, sthālyāṃ pacati is the very activity that resides in the agent in asiś chinatti, sthālī pacati, so karmavattva would apply there too; 'karmaṇā' prevents it. BM says Bhaṭṭoji adds 'kiṃca' out of dissatisfaction (asvarasa) with this answer, since one could argue that 'dhātoḥ' is carried forward from 'dhātor ekācaḥ…' [SK 2629] and the activity of sword and pot is not expressed by the root. Followed: the reference of 'pūrvokte' to the opening examples.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1, where our OCR drops two printed lines; read from NSP scan page-0478) on 'karaṇādhikaraṇābhyām': with only 'tulyakriyaḥ kartā' the rule would overextend, since the activity of instrument and locus in asinā chinatti, sthālyāṃ pacati is the very activity that resides in the agent in asiś chinatti, sthālī pacati. TB then rejects the objection that the sword's or pot's activity, though real, is not expressed by the root: the action that is the counterpart of the similarity is not qualified as root-expressed, for the sūtra nowhere says 'similar in action to the action expressed by the root'. TB grounds 'kiṃca' in a different doubt: even without 'karmaṇā', the question 'like what?' would be answered by proximity to 'karmavat'. Recorded.
- commentary BM and TB disagree on why Bhaṭṭoji adds 'kiṃca'. BM grounds it in dissatisfaction with the 'karmaṇā' answer, because 'dhātoḥ' could be carried forward and the sword's or pot's activity is not expressed by the root; TB explicitly rejects that very objection and grounds 'kiṃca' in the proximity doubt. Recorded (§16); the English ('Moreover:') takes neither side.
- commentary BM on the agent-residing examples: gacchati grāmaḥ = the village becomes the locus of being reached without toil because the road is smooth and near; ārohati hastī = the elephant, lowering itself without the driver's goad, becomes the locus of mounting; 'adhigacchati śāstrārthaḥ smarati śraddadhāti ca' is the first half of a verse whose second half is 'yatkṛpāleśatas tasmai namo 'stu gurave sadā', i.e. the meaning of the śāstra becomes the object of certainty, memory and faith through a particle of the teacher's grace. Here the action resides in the agent, so no karmavattva, and the agent operations (śap etc.) apply. Followed: the 'i.e.' glosses.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1): the second half of the verse beginning 'adhigacchati' is 'yatkṛpāleśatas tasmai namo 'stu gurave sadā'. TB then asks how agent-residing roots like gam are to be known, since fruit and activity are both the root sense for pac, bhid and gam alike, which Bhaṭṭoji answers with 'yatra karmaṇi…'. Recorded.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) on 'grāmeṣu': the same lack of difference holds of mounted and unmounted elephants, understood and not-understood meanings of the śāstra, and so on. Recorded.
- commentary BM on 'karotir utpādanārthaḥ': kṛ means the activity conducive to coming into being, as the Bhāṣya on the bhūvādi sūtra makes clear. On 'kāriṣyate ghaṭa ityādi' BM supplies the forms covered by 'ityādi': kāriṣyate with the ciṇvat iṭ, kariṣyate without it (iṭ by 'ṛddhanoḥ sye', SK 2366); kāriṣīṣṭa / kṛṣīṣṭa; luṅ akāri / akṛta; tāsi kāritā / kartā; and kriyate ghaṭaḥ svayam eva with yak. Recorded; the English keeps Bhaṭṭoji's 'and so on'.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) on 'kāriṣyate': optional ciṇvat iṭ by 'syasicsīyuṭ…', otherwise iṭ by 'ṛddhanoḥ sye', kariṣyate; and lists akāriṣyata / akariṣyata, akāriṣṭa / akṛta, kāriṣīṣṭa / kṛṣīṣṭa, kāritā / kartā, kriyate ghaṭaḥ svayam eva, akāri. TB adds that this refutes the Naiyāyika view that the verbal ending signifies effort, and that if kṛ meant effort it would not even be transitive, like yatate. Recorded; the English keeps Bhaṭṭoji's 'and so on'.
- commentary BM on 'etena … vyākhyātam': 'etena' = by establishing that cognition resides in the agent; 'vyākhyātam' = justified. anuvyavasāya is ascertainment; its karmakartṛ, the matter (artha), shows no distinction produced by it, while the ascertainer (e.g. Devadatta) shows joy etc., so the action resides in the agent and there is no yak; with yak, ī by 'ghumāsthā…' [SK 2462] would give anuvyavasīyamāna. The form comes from 'ṣo antakarmaṇi' with anu-vi-ava, śyan, and deletion of o by 'otaḥ śyani' [SK 2510]. Followed: 'the o is deleted'.
- commentary BM on 'tācchīlyādāv ayaṃ cānaś': the -āna is cānaś by 'tācchīlyavayovacanaśaktiṣu cānaś' [SK 3109]; not being a substitute of the lakāra it is not ātmanepada, so it applies freely in the karmakartṛ without karmavattva. Followed: '[prescribed] for habit and the rest'.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1): with yak, one would get anuvyavasīyamāna; o is deleted by 'otaḥ śyani'; asked how śānac is possible without karmavattva, Bhaṭṭoji answers 'tācchīlyādau'; 'na tu' means śānac does not occur. Followed.
- commentary BM: karmavattva is stated for the agent of single-object roots like chid, bhid, which become intransitive when the object is meant as agent; for double-object roots that stay transitive even then, the prohibition of karmavattva for their object-agent must be stated. Followed: '[dhātus that remain] transitive' and '[of being treated like the object]'.
- commentary BM: in anyonyaṃ spṛśataḥ (Yajñadatta and Devadatta touch each other) each is both agent and object of touching, so karmavattva would apply and give spṛśyete; the vārttika prevents it. ajā grāmaṃ nayati = the goat reaches the village of itself; but BM says that, since there is no difference between a village gone to and not gone to, karmavattva is not even obtained there, so this is not an example of the vārttika; the Bhāṣya gives only anyonyam āśliṣyataḥ, anyonyaṃ spṛśataḥ, anyonyaṃ saṅgṛhītaḥ (so the Śabdenduśekhara). Recorded; the English translates both examples neutrally (§16).
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) argues the other way: in anyonyaṃ spṛśataḥ the actions must be held distinct (each is agent of its own touching, object of the other's), so karmavadbhāva is not obtained and the vārttika is not needed there; Bhaṭṭoji therefore adds ajā grāmaṃ nayati, where karmavadbhāva is obtained because what is intended (uddeśyatā) is the object-part, the conjunction [with the village]; without the prohibition yak, and ātmanepada, would follow. Recorded; the commentators disagree here, and the English stays neutral (§16).
- commentary BM: 'karmavattvam' is the word to be supplied (śeṣaḥ). These two being double-object roots, they remain transitive through the other object even when one object is meant as agent, so the preceding vārttika would prohibit karmavattva; this is a counter-exception (pratiprasava) to it. Followed: '[being treated like the object holds]'.
- commentary TB (sk.2766.t1) on 'duhipacyoḥ': these two being double-object, they remain transitive even when one object is meant as agent; the prohibition being obtained, this [vārttika] is begun. Followed.
- textual Ours reads 'viklattiḥ'. NSP p. 468 (scan page-0478, read at magnification in collation batch05) has the same. The noun from klid is viklitti, as BM (sk.2766.b1: viklittyāśraya, viklittiḥ) and Wikisource read; the English renders viklitti. Mūla, for Ajai's Print Check.
- textual Ours 'karotirūtpādanārthaḥ' (long ū); NSP p. 469 (scan page-0479) 'karotir utpādanārthaḥ' (short u), as the sandhi requires. Rendered from the print reading. Mūla, for Ajai's Print Check.
- textual Ours 'pratiṣetho' (with th); NSP p. 469 (scan page-0479) 'pratiṣedho'. Rendered as pratiṣedhaḥ. Mūla, for Ajai's Print Check.
- textual k3 and k5 begin with the editorial tag '(vārttikam) ||', which closes the preceding vārttika; the 1915 print marks the vārttikas with its sign before them instead (scan page-0479) and has no such tag. k5 consists of the tag alone, so the block is rendered '—'. In the print, SK 2767 follows directly on 'duhipacyor bahulaṃ sakarmakayor iti vācyam ||'; the pac example for this vārttika (udumbaraḥ phalaṃ pacyate) appears under SK 2769.
- translator The bracketed glosses of the examples, the impersonal glosses of pacyate odanena, bhidyate kāṣṭhena and bhettavyaṃ kusūlena, are the translator's, drawn from the commentators' discussion of 'vat'. The bracket '[as opposed to an extension of rules (śāstrātideśa)]' after 'kāryātideśa' follows BM and TB, which both contrast kāryātideśa with śāstrātideśa at this point. The source of the phrase 'anuvyavasyamāne 'rthe' is not named by Bhaṭṭoji and is left unidentified.